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Abstract
Any attempt to construct a realist interpretation of quantum theory founders
on the Kochen-Specker theorem, which asserts the impossibility of assigning values
to quantum quantities in a way that preserves functional relations between them.
We construct a new type of valuation which is defined on all operators, and which
respects an appropriate version of the functional composition principle. The truth-
values assigned to propositions are (i) contextual; and (ii) multi-valued, where the
space of contexts and the multi-valued logic for each context come naturally from
the topos theory of presheaves.
The first step in our theory is to demonstrate that the Kochen-Specker theorem
is equivalent to the statement that a certain presheaf defined on the category of self-
adjoint operators has no global elements. We then show how the use of ideas drawn
from the theory of presheaves leads to the definition of a generalized valuation in
quantum theory whose values are sieves of operators. In particular, we show how
each quantum state leads to such a generalized valuation.
A key ingredient throughout is the idea that, in a situation where no normal
truth-value can be given to a proposition asserting that the value of a physical
quantity A lies in a subset ∆ ⊂ IR, it is nevertheless possible to ascribe a partial
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3Small clarifications added concerning operators with continuous spectra; September 1998.
truth-value which is determined by the set of all coarse-grained propositions that
assert that some function f(A) lies in f(∆), and that are true in a normal sense.
The set of all such coarse-grainings forms a sieve on the category of self-adjoint
operators, and is hence fundamentally related to the theory of presheaves.
1 Introduction
1.1 Preliminary Remarks
Anyone who has taught an introductory course on quantum theory will have encountered
the anguish that can accompany a student’s first engagement with the problematic status
of beliefs previously deemed to be self-evidently true. In particular, it is difficult to
remove the compelling conviction that, at any given time, any physical quantity must
have a value.
In classical physics, there is no problem with this belief since the underlying math-
ematical structure is geared precisely to express it. Specifically, if S is the state space
of some classical system, a physical quantity A is represented by a real-valued function
A¯ : S → IR; and then the value Vs(A) of A in any state s ∈ S is simply
V s(A) = A¯(s). (1.1)
Thus all physical quantities possess a value in any state. Furthermore, if h : IR → IR
is a real-valued function, a new physical quantity h(A) can be defined by requiring the
associated function h(A) to be
h(A)(s) := h(A¯(s)) (1.2)
for all s ∈ S; i.e., h(A) := h ◦ A¯ : S → IR. Thus the physical quantity h(A) is defined by
saying that its value in any state s is the result of applying the function h to the value
of A; hence, by definition, the values of the physical quantities h(A) and A satisfy the
‘functional composition principle’
V s(h(A)) = h(V s(A)) (1.3)
for all states s ∈ S.
However, to the distress of angst-ridden students, standard quantum theory precludes
any such naive realist interpretation of the relation between formalism and physical world.
And this is not just because of some wilfully obdurate philosophical interpretation of the
theory: rather, the obstruction comes from the mathematical formalism itself, in the guise
of the famous Kochen-Specker theorem which asserts the impossibility of assigning values
to all physical quantities whilst, at the same time, preserving the functional relations
between them [1].4
In a quantum theory, a physical quantity A is represented by a self-adjoint operator
Aˆ on the Hilbert space of the system, and the first thing one has to decide is whether to
regard a valuation as a function of the physical quantities themselves, or on the operators
that represent them. From a mathematical perspective, the latter strategy is preferable,
and we shall therefore define a (global) valuation to be a real-valued function V on the
set of all bounded, self-adjoint operators, with the properties that : (i) the value V (Aˆ) of
4As has been emphasized by Brown [2], the essential result is already contained in Bell’s seminal first
paper on hidden variables [3].
the physical quantity A represented by the operator Aˆ belongs to the spectrum of Aˆ (the
so-called ‘value rule’); and (ii) the functional composition principle (or FUNC for short)
holds:
V (Bˆ) = h(V (Aˆ)) (1.4)
for any pair of self-adjoint operators Aˆ, Bˆ such that Bˆ = h(Aˆ) for some real-valued
function h. If they existed, such valuations could be used to embed the set of self-
adjoint operators in the commutative ring of real-valued functions on an underlying space
S of microstates, thereby laying the foundations for a hidden-variable interpretation of
quantum theory.
Several important results follow from the definition of a valuation. For example, if Aˆ1
and Aˆ2 commute, there exists an operator Cˆ and functions h1 and h2 such that Aˆ1 = h1(Cˆ)
and Aˆ2 = h2(Cˆ); it then follows from FUNC that
V (Aˆ1 + Aˆ2) = V (Aˆ1) + V (Aˆ2) (1.5)
and
V (Aˆ1Aˆ2) = V (Aˆ1)V (Aˆ2). (1.6)
The defining equation Eq. (1.4) for a valuation makes sense whatever the nature of
the spectrum σ(Aˆ) of the operator Aˆ. However, if σ(Aˆ) contains a continuous part, one
might doubt the physical meaning of assigning one of its elements as a value; indeed, in
the present paper, we shall consider valuations in this sense as being defined only on the
subset of operators whose spectrum is purely discrete. To handle the more general case,
we shall reconceive a valuation as primarily giving truth-values to propositions about the
values of a physical quantity, rather than assigning a specific value to the quantity itself.
The propositions concerned are of the type ‘A ∈ ∆’, which asserts that the value of
the physical quantity A lies in the Borel subset ∆ of the spectrum σ(Aˆ) of the associated
operator Aˆ. Of course, such assertions are meaningful for both discrete and continuous
spectra: which motivates studying the general mathematical problem of assigning truth-
values to projection operators.
If Pˆ is a projection operator, the identity Pˆ = Pˆ 2 implies that V (Pˆ ) = V (Pˆ 2) =
(V (Pˆ ))2 (from Eq. (1.6)); and hence, necessarily, V (Pˆ ) = 0 or 1. Thus V defines a
homomorphism from the Boolean algebra {0ˆ, 1ˆ, Pˆ ,¬Pˆ ≡ (1ˆ− Pˆ )} to the ‘false(0)-true(1)’
Boolean algebra {0, 1}. More generally, a valuation V induces a homomorphism χV :
W → {0, 1} where W is any Boolean subalgebra of the lattice P of projectors on H. In
particular,
αˆ ≤ βˆ implies χV (αˆ) ≤ χV (βˆ) (1.7)
where ‘αˆ ≤ βˆ’ refers to the partial ordering in the lattice P, and ‘χV (αˆ) ≤ χV (βˆ)’ is the
ordering in the Boolean algebra {0, 1}. This result has an important implication for us,
to which we shall return shortly.
The Kochen-Specker theorem asserts that no global valuations exist if the dimension
of the Hilbert space H is greater than two. The obstructions to the existence of such
valuations typically arise when trying to assign a single value to an operator Cˆ that can
be written as Cˆ = g(Aˆ) and as Cˆ = h(Bˆ) with [Aˆ, Bˆ] 6= 0.
One response to this result is to note that the theorem does not preclude the existence
of ‘partial’, or ‘local’, valuations—i.e., valuations that are defined only on some subset of
the set of self-adjoint operators; a typical example would be any complete set of commuting
operators on the Hilbert space. However, if partial valuations are to form part of a proper
interpretative framework, the question immediately arises as to how the domain of any
such valuation is to be chosen.
The extant interpretations of quantum theory that aspire to use ‘beables’, rather than
‘observables’, are all concerned in one way or another with addressing this issue. One
well-known approach is that of Bohm, where certain physical quantities—for example,
the position of a particle—are declared by fiat to be those that always have a value. In
other, so-called ‘modal’ approaches, the domain of a partial valuation depends on the
quantum state; as, for example, in the works of van Fraassen [4, 5], Kochen [6], Healey
[7], Clifton [8], Dieks [9], Vermaas and Dieks [10], Bacciagaluppi and Hemmo [11], and
Bub [12].
Inherent in such schemes is a type of ‘contextuality’ in which a value ascribed to a
physical quantity C cannot be part of a global assignment of values but must, instead,
depend on some context in which C is to be considered. In practice, contextuality is
endemic in any attempt to ascribe properties to quantities in a quantum theory. For
example, as emphasized by Bell [3], in the situation where Cˆ = g(Aˆ) = h(Bˆ), if the value of
C is construed counterfactually as referring to what would be obtained if a measurement
of A or of B is made—and with the value of C then being defined by applying the relation
C = g(A), or C = h(B), to the result of the measurement—then one can claim that the
actual value obtained depends on whether the value of C is determined by measuring A,
or by measuring B.
In the programme to be discussed here, the idea of a contextual valuation will be
developed in a different direction from that of the existing modal interpretations. In
particular, rather than accepting only a limited domain of beables we shall propose a
theory of ‘generalized’ valuations that are defined globally on all propositions about values
of physical quantities. However, the price of global existence is that any given proposition
may have only a ‘partial ’ truth-value. More precisely, (i) the truth-value of a proposition
‘A ∈ ∆’ belongs to a logical structure that is larger than {0, 1}; and (ii) these target-logics
are context-dependent.
It is clear that the main task is to formulate mathematically the idea of a contextual,
‘partial’ truth-value in such a way that the assignment of generalized truth-values is
consistent with an appropriate analogue of the functional composition principle FUNC.
The scheme also has to have some meaningful physical interpretation; in particular, we
want the set of all possible partial truth-values for any given context to form some sort
of distributive logic, in order to facilitate a proper semantics for this ‘neo-realist’ view of
quantum theory.
1.2 Generalized Logic in Quantum Physics
Our central idea is that, although in a given situation in quantum theory it may not be
possible to declare a particular proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ to be true (nor false), nevertheless
there may be (Borel) functions f such that the associated propositions ‘f(A) ∈ f(∆)’ can
be said to be true. This possibility arises for the following reason.
Let WA denote the spectral algebra of the operator Aˆ that represents a physical quan-
tity A: thus WA is the Boolean algebra of projectors Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] that project onto the
eigenspaces associated with the Borel subsets ∆ of the spectrum σ(Aˆ) of Aˆ; physically
speaking, Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] represents the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’. It follows from the spectral
theorem that, for all Borel subsets J of the spectrum of f(Aˆ), the spectral projector
Eˆ[f(A) ∈ J ] for the operator f(Aˆ) is equal to the spectral projector Eˆ[A ∈ f−1(J)] for
Aˆ. In particular, if f(∆) is a Borel subset of σ(f(Aˆ)) (which is automatically true if
the spectrum of Aˆ is discrete; we shall discuss the non-discrete case later) then, since
∆ ⊆ f−1(f(∆)), we have Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Eˆ[A ∈ f−1(f(∆))]; and hence
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)]. (1.8)
Physically, the inequality in Eq. (1.8) reflects the fact that the proposition ‘f(A) ∈
f(∆)’ is generally weaker than the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ in the sense that the latter implies
the former, but not necessarily vice versa. For example, the proposition ‘f(A) = f(a)’ is
weaker than the original proposition ‘A = a’ if the function f is many-to-one and such
that more than one eigenvalue of Aˆ is mapped to the same eigenvalue of f(Aˆ). In general,
we shall say that ‘f(A) ∈ f(∆)’ is a coarse-graining of ‘A ∈ ∆’.
Now if the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ is evaluated as ‘true’ by, for example, a partial valuation
V of the type mentioned at the end of Section 1.1—so that V (Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) = 1—then, from
Eq. (1.7) and Eq. (1.8), it follows that the weaker proposition ‘f(A) ∈ f(∆)’ is also
evaluated as ‘true’.
This remark provokes the following observation. There may be situations in which,
although the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ cannot be said to be either true or false, the weaker
proposition ‘f(A) ∈ f(∆)’ can be. In particular, if the latter can be given the value
‘true’ in a total sense, then—by virtue of the remark above—it is natural to suppose
that any further coarse-graining to give an operator g(f(Aˆ)) will yield a proposition
‘g(f(A)) ∈ g(f(∆))’ that also is to be evaluated as ‘true’. Note that there may be more
than one possible choice for the ‘initial’ function f , each of which can then be further
coarse-grained in this way. This multi-branched picture of coarse-graining is one of the
main justifications for our invocation of the topos-theoretic idea of a presheaf.
In fact, guided by the remarks above, the procedure we shall adopt in Section 3 is
first to consider partial valuations—which assign truth-values 0 or 1 in a standard way,
but are defined on less than all the operators—and then to go on to define the partial
truth-value (associated with each partial valuation V ) of any proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ to be
the set of all operators Bˆ of the form Bˆ = f(Aˆ) that are in the domain of V , and which
are such that the weaker proposition ‘f(A) ∈ f(∆)’ is ‘totally true’—i.e., it is assigned
the unit in the logic of partial truth-values.
We shall then generalize this idea in Section 4 where we extract the key properties
of these partial truth-values and use them to formulate a definition of a ‘generalized
valuation’, the semantic interpretation of which is that the truth-value of a proposition
‘A ∈ ∆’ is a set of coarse-grained propositions ‘f(A) ∈ f(∆)’ each of which can be
regarded as being totally true. As we shall show, any quantum state gives rise to such a
generalized valuation.
The key property of such a generalized truth-value is that it is a sieve in a certain
category formed from the self-adjoint operators on the Hilbert space of the system—and
it is a fundamental property of sieves that they form a Heyting algebra, and hence have
the structure of a distributive logic; albeit one that is intuitionistic, not classical, in
the sense that the logical law of excluded middle is replaced with the weaker condition
α∨¬α ≤ 1. These sieves are associated with a certain presheaf—the ‘spectral presheaf’—
that is naturally associated with any quantum theory: this is how ideas from topos theory
enter our scheme.
This procedure was partly motivated by an earlier paper in which topos ideas were
applied to the consistent histories approach to quantum theory [13]; in particular, it was
shown there how a topos framework fits naturally with the multi-branched, coarse-graining
operations that play a central role in the construction of consistent sets of propositions.
Contextuality arises explicitly there as the need to choose a particular consistent set
of histories; and—in fact—topos-theoretic ideas can be expected to arise naturally in
any physical theory where contextuality plays a central role. Presheaves are particularly
important in this respect since they are naturally associated with contextual, generalized
truth-values given by the so-called ‘subobject classifier’.
Another motivation for our procedure is more general and conceptual. In short, it
represents a via media between two extremes in the semantics, or interpretation, of quan-
tum theory. For, on the one hand, the Kochen-Specker theorem shows the impossibility
of sustaining any naive realist interpretation of quantum theory in which propositions
about the values of physical quantities are handled with the simple type of Boolean
logic which is characteristic of, for example, the set of subsets of a classical state space.
And, on the other hand, we believe that the ‘logical’ structure inherent in the lattice
of projection operators that represent quantum propositions mathematically is too non-
classical—in particular, it is non-distributive—to fulfill any genuine semantic role. (This
is a well-known viewpoint; for example, see Dummett’s [14] critique of Putnam’s proposal
to “read the logic off Hilbert space” [15].) Our aim is to find a middle path between these
extremes with the aid of logical structures that are certainly not just simple Boolean
algebras—our logics are contextual and intuitionistic—but which retain the semantically
crucial property of distributivity. We hope that this intermediate position will extend a
little our encompassing of ‘quantum reality’.
1.3 Some Expected Properties of Generalized Truth Values
To further motivate the detailed constructions that will be made in this paper it is helpful
at this stage to consider what can be said ab initio about the assignment of partial truth
values. For example, presumably the minimum that should be satisfied by the analogue
of FUNC is that if Bˆ = h(Aˆ), and if the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ is assigned the value ‘totally
true’, then the proposition ‘B ∈ h(∆)’ should also be ‘totally true’. As we shall see, this
requirement is implemented in a simple way in the presheaf framework which we employ.
A central problem in handling multi-valued truth-values is to understand how the
internal mathematical operations of the ‘target’ logic are to be related to the logical
structure of the propositions being evaluated. More precisely, let L denote the Boolean
algebra of all propositions of the type ‘A ∈ ∆’ for some fixed physical quantity A—and
suppose we have some assignment of partial truth-values, ν : L → T (L), where T (L) is
the target logic in the context of L. Then how should the structure of L be reflected in
the properties of ν and the logical structure of T (L)? For example, is ν some type of
algebraic homomorphism? The minimum that can be said in this direction would seem
to be the following.
Firstly, the null proposition corresponding to the zero element 0L ∈ L should presum-
ably always be valued as totally false; and hence we expect ν(0L) = 0T (L) in all contexts.
Secondly, if α, β ∈ L are such that α ≤ β, then the physical interpretation is that the
proposition α implies the proposition β; an example is ‘A ∈ ∆1’ and ‘A ∈ ∆2’ respectively,
with ∆1 ⊆ ∆2. Under these circumstances, the analogy with Eq. (1.7) suggests that the
generalized truth-values should satisfy ν(α) ≤ ν(β) in the target logic T (L). In what
follows, we shall refer to this central requirement as the ‘monotonicity’ condition.
Now, for any α, β ∈ L, we have α ≤ α ∨ β and β ≤ α ∨ β; hence it follows from
monotonicity that ν(α) ≤ ν(α ∨ β) and ν(β) ≤ ν(α ∨ β). This implies that, in the logic
T (L),
ν(α) ∨ ν(β) ≤ ν(α ∨ β) (1.9)
if we assume that the ‘or’ operation in the target logic T (L) behaves as expected, i.e., it
is the least upper bound for the partial ordering.
One might wonder if the stronger disjunctive rule ν(α ∨ β) = ν(α) ∨ ν(β) holds but,
on reflection, this is at variance with certain key ideas of quantum theory. For example,
suppose that α and β are the propositions ‘A = a1’ and ‘A = a2’ respectively, with
a1 6= a2. Then the projection operators that represent these propositions project onto the
eigenstates of Aˆ corresponding to the eigenvalues a1 and a2 respectively. However, in the
lattice of projectors, the disjunction of these operators projects onto the two-dimensional
space spanned by these eigenvectors, which is strictly bigger than the union of the pair of
one-dimensional spaces (which, indeed, is not a linear subspace at all). Hence a generalized
truth-value ν(α ∨ β) of α ∨ β might be greater (in the logical sense) than the disjunction
of the generalized truth-values of α and β separately. We shall see in several concrete
examples that this is indeed the case.
Similarly, for any α, β ∈ L, we have α∧β ≤ α and α∧β ≤ β, so that, by monotonicity,
ν(α ∧ β) ≤ ν(α) and ν(α ∧ β) ≤ ν(β). Assuming that the ‘and’ operation, ‘∧’, in the
target logic T (L) behaves as expected—i.e., is the greatest lower bound for the partial
ordering—it follows that
ν(α ∧ β) ≤ ν(α) ∧ ν(β). (1.10)
Here also, one might wonder if a stronger conjunctive rule ν(α ∧ β) = ν(α) ∧ ν(β) holds;
but we can see at once that it cannot do so in any scheme in which ‘blurred’ truth-values
occur. For example, suppose once more that α and β are the propositions ‘A = a1’
and ‘A = a2’ respectively, with a1 6= a2. Then, as explained earlier, our key idea is to
assign a partial truth-value to a proposition like ‘A = a’ by finding a ‘coarse-grained’
operator Bˆ = f(Aˆ) such that the weaker proposition ‘f(A) = f(a)’ is totally true. One
consequence is that, even though the propositions ‘A = a1’ and ‘A = a2’ are disjoint—so
that α∧ β = 0—this does not imply that ν(α)∧ ν(β) is totally false: all that is needed is
an operator Bˆ = f(Aˆ) with f(a1) = f(a2) and such that ‘f(A) = f(a1)’ is unequivocally
true. In this circumstance, the strict inequality holds in Eq. (1.10).
The monotonicity rule requires supplementing in one respect. Consider again the
propositions ‘A = a1’ and ‘A = a2’ with a1 6= a2, and suppose the generalized valuation
is such that ν(A = a1) = 1T (L)—i.e., the proposition ‘A = a1’ is totally true in the logic
T (L). Then it seems natural to require that the disjoint proposition ‘A = a2’ cannot also
be totally true, even though it need not be totally false either. However, for the following
reason, this restriction—which we shall refer to as ‘exclusivity’—cannot be deduced from
the monotonicity condition.
The disjointness condition α ∧ β = 0 in the Boolean algebra L, implies that β ≤ ¬α;
and hence, using monotonicity,
ν(β) ≤ ν(¬α). (1.11)
Now, if we assumed that ν : L → T (L) commutes with the negation operation, in the
sense that
ν(¬α) = ¬ν(α), (1.12)
then Eq. (1.11) plus the hypothesis ν(α) = 1T (L), would imply that ν(β) ≤ ¬ν(α) =
¬1T (L) = 0T (L); hence ν(β) = 0T (L), which certainly satisfies exclusivity. However, it turns
out that the equality Eq. (1.12) is precisely what cannot be assumed in our theory since,
as we shall see later, the target logic for the generalized truth-values is a Heyting algebra,
and the negation operation in an intuitionistic logic of this type behaves differently from
that in a Boolean algebra. As a result, the exclusivity condition cannot be derived from
monotonicity, and it must therefore be added as an extra requirement.
Putting together all these remarks, we arrive at the following tentative, minimal list of
algebraic properties that we expect to be satisfied by a generalized valuation ν : L→ T (L)
of a Boolean logic L:
Null condition: ν(0L) = 0T (L) (1.13)
Monotonicity: α ≤ β implies ν(α) ≤ ν(β) (1.14)
Exclusivity: If α ∧ β = 0L and ν(α) = 1T (L), then ν(β) < 1T (L) (1.15)
As we shall see, the examples of generalized valuations in quantum theory given in this
paper satisfy these requirements. Another condition that we might want to add is
Unit condition: ν(1L) = 1T (L) (1.16)
which, as we shall see, is also satisfied by the valuations associated with quantum states.
On the other hand, it can be violated by the generalized valuations, which we mentioned
in Section 1.2 that are associated with partial valuations (mentioned in Section 1.2). We
shall see this explicitly in Section 3.4.
1.4 Prospectus
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we show how the Kochen-Specker theorem
can be viewed as asserting the non-existence of global sections of certain presheaves that
are naturally associated with any quantum theory. A key ingredient here is the idea that
the set of all bounded, self-adjoint operators forms an appropriate category on which
to form presheaves, as does the set of all Boolean subalgebras of projectors. Readers
unfamiliar with topos theory may find it helpful to read the Appendix before embarking
on this section.
By rewriting the Kochen-Specker theorem in terms of presheaves, several ways of
generalizing the idea of a valuation present themselves. In this paper we pursue one
particular scheme: to motivate the definition we finally arrive at, we show in Section 3
how a partial valuation (of the type used in the extant modal interpretations of quantum
theory) gives rise to a generalized valuation whose truth-values lie in the Heyting algebra
of sieves on an object in the category of self-adjoint operators. By these means, we arrive
naturally at contextualized, multi-valued truth-value assignments.
Then, in Section 4 we use these results to motivate the formal definition of a generalized
valuation, and we show how any state in a quantum theory gives rise to one such. In
Section 5, we extend these ideas to the case where the space of contexts is taken as the
category of all Boolean subalgebras of projectors, rather than the category of self-adjoint
operators.
This paper is intended to be the first in a series devoted to an extensive analysis of the
possible uses of topos ideas in quantum theory. Our main aim in the present paper is to
present the basic mathematical tools and some general ideas about using quantum states
to produce generalized valuations, but this leaves much work to be done: in particular,
an analysis of the philosophical implications of generalized truth-values will be given in a
future paper, as will the way in which similar ideas can arise in classical physics [16]. For
this reason, the present paper concludes with a short summary of what has been achieved
so far, and a list of some of the more significant topics for further research.
2 The Kochen-Specker Theorem in the Language of
Topos Theory
2.1 The Categories of Boolean Algebras and Self-adjoint Oper-
ators
A key step in formulating the Kochen-Specker theorem in the language of topos theory is
the construction of several categories that will form the domains of the presheaf functors
we shall be using later. Readers unfamiliar with topos theory may find it helpful to
read the Appendix first. This contains a short introduction to the relevant parts of topos
theory, particularly the theory of presheaves and the associated use of sieves as generalized
truth-values.
We start with the set W of all Boolean subalgebras of the lattice P(H) of projection
operators on the Hilbert space H of the quantum system. This forms a poset under
subalgebra inclusion, W2 ⊆ W1. As with any poset, W can be regarded as a category
in which (i) the objects are defined to be the elements W ∈ W of the poset; and (ii) a
morphism is defined to exist from W2 to W1 if W2 ⊆W1; we shall write this morphism as
iW2W1 : W2 → W1. Thus there is at most one morphism between any two objects.
The next step is to introduce the set O of all bounded, self-adjoint operators on the
Hilbert space H. First, recall that any such operator Aˆ has the spectral representation5
Aˆ =
∫
σ(Aˆ)
λ dEˆAλ (2.1)
where σ(Aˆ) ⊂ IR is the spectrum of Aˆ, and {EˆAλ | λ ∈ σ(Aˆ)} is the spectral family of
Aˆ. The spectral projection operators Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] are determined by the spectral family
according to
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] =
∫
∆
dEˆAλ (2.2)
where ∆ is any Borel subset of the spectrum of Aˆ. In particular, if a belongs to the
discrete spectrum of Aˆ, the projector onto the eigenspace with eigenvalue a is
Eˆ[A = a] := Eˆ[A ∈ {a}]. (2.3)
Then, if f : IR→ IR is any bounded Borel function, the operator f(Aˆ) is defined by
f(Aˆ) :=
∫
σ(Aˆ)
f(λ) dEˆAλ . (2.4)
Note that if functions f and g exist such that Bˆ = f(Aˆ) and Bˆ = g(Aˆ), this does not
imply that f and g are equal: in the discrete case it means only that their restrictions
to σ(Aˆ) are equal; more generally, measure-theoretic issues arise, and we shall define two
bounded Borel functions f, g : σ(Aˆ)→ IR to be equivalent if f(Aˆ) = g(Aˆ).
We are now ready to turnO into a category. We define the objects to be the elements of
O, and we say that there is a ‘morphism’ from Bˆ to Aˆ if there exists a Borel function (more
precisely, an equivalence class of Borel functions) f : σ(Aˆ)→ IR such that Bˆ = f(Aˆ). As
implied above, any such function on σ(Aˆ) is unique (up to the equivalence relation), and
hence there is at most one morphism between any two operators; if such exists—i.e., if
Bˆ = f(Aˆ), for some f : σ(Aˆ) → IR—the corresponding morphism in the category O will
be denoted fO : Bˆ → Aˆ. Note that we could make the corresponding definitions for any
5As usual, the expression in Eq. (2.1) is shorthand for the equation 〈ψ, Aˆφ〉 = ∫ λd〈ψ, Eˆλφ〉 for all
ψ, φ ∈ H, whose right hand side is to be interpreted as a Stieltjes integral. A similar remark applies to
the integrals in Eq. (2.2) and Eq. (2.4).
subset of O that it is closed under the action of constructing functions of its members.
In what follows, we shall be especially concerned with the category Od of all bounded
self-adjoint operators whose spectra are discrete.
The categories W and O are closely related6 via a certain covariant functor W : O →
W:
Definition 2.1 The spectral algebra functor is the covariant functorW : O →W defined
as follows:
• On objects: W(Aˆ) := WA, where WA is the spectral algebra of the operator Aˆ (i.e.,
the collection of all projectors onto the subspaces of H associated with Borel subsets
of σ(Aˆ)).
• On morphisms: If fO : Bˆ → Aˆ, then W(fO) : WB → WA is defined as the subset
inclusion iWBWA : WB →WA.
In defining the map W(fO) : WB → WA we have exploited the fact that the spectral
algebra for Bˆ = f(Aˆ) is naturally embedded in the spectral algebra for Aˆ according to
the result Eˆ[f(A) ∈ J ] = Eˆ[A ∈ f−1(J)], for all Borel subsets J ⊆ σ(Bˆ). Rigorously
speaking, we could write iWf(A)W (Eˆ[f(A) ∈ J ]) = Eˆ[A ∈ f−1(J)].
Note that we have defined fO to be a morphism from Bˆ to Aˆ—rather than from Aˆ to
Bˆ—so as to ensure that the categories O and W match up in this way. One consequence
of this choice is the reversal of arrows in the equation
fO ◦ gO = (g ◦ f)O (2.5)
where the left hand side denotes composition in the category O, and the right hand
side denotes normal composition of functions, so that if Bˆ = f(Aˆ) and Cˆ = g(Bˆ), the
functional relation Cˆ = g(f(Aˆ)) ≡ g ◦ f(Aˆ) translates to the morphism fO ◦ gO : Cˆ → Aˆ
in the category O.
It should be noted that pairs of operators Aˆ 6= Bˆ exist such that Bˆ = f(Aˆ) and
Aˆ = g(Bˆ) for suitable functions f and g. In the category O, these relations become
fO : Bˆ → Aˆ and gO : Aˆ→ Bˆ with
gO ◦ fO = idB; fO ◦ gO = idA. (2.6)
One consequence of the existence of such pairs is that O is only a pre-ordered space since
it lacks the antisymmetry property7 of a true poset (which W is). However, it follows
from Eq. (2.6) that two such operators are isomorphic objects in the category O, and it
is therefore possible to construct a new category [O] whose objects are the equivalence
classes of operators, where two operators are regarded as being equivalent if they are
isomorphic as objects in O. Finally, we note that if Aˆ and Bˆ are related as in Eq. (2.6)
then they have the same spectral algebras; i.e.,WA =WB, and hence [O] is closely related
to the category W.
6Another, closely related, category has as its objects the abelian subalgebras of the algebra of bounded,
self-adjoint operators. The fact that this can be regarded as a category was mentioned in the original
paper of Kochen and Specker [1].
7A pre-ordered set X is said to have the antisymmetry property if x  y and y  x implies x = y.
2.2 The Spectral Presheaf on Od and the Kochen-Specker The-
orem
A central step in developing our use of topos theory is the observation that the spectra
of the self-adjoint operators on a Hilbert space can be used to form a presheaf on the
category Od of self-adjoint operators whose spectra are discrete. Specifically:
Definition 2.2 The spectral presheaf on Od is the contravariant functor Σ : Od → Set
defined as follows:
1. On objects: Σ(Aˆ) := σ(Aˆ)—the spectrum of the self-adjoint operator Aˆ.
2. On morphisms: If fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ, so that Bˆ = f(Aˆ), then Σ(fOd) : σ(Aˆ) → σ(Bˆ) is
defined by Σ(fOd)(λ) := f(λ) for all λ ∈ σ(Aˆ).
Note that Σ(fOd) is well-defined since, if λ ∈ σ(Aˆ), then f(λ) is indeed an element of the
spectrum of Bˆ; indeed, for these discrete-spectrum operators we have σ(f(Aˆ)) = f(σ(Aˆ)).
It is straightforward to see that Σ is a genuine functor. It clearly respects domains
and codomains of a morphism in Od in the desired way, and Σ(idA) = idσ(A). The key
step is to show that Σ(fOd ◦ gOd) = Σ(gOd) ◦ Σ(fOd). So, suppose that fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ
and gOd : Cˆ → Bˆ, so that Bˆ = f(Aˆ) and Cˆ = g(Bˆ). Then fOd ◦ gOd : Cˆ → Aˆ with
Cˆ = g(f(Aˆ)) = g ◦ f(Aˆ). Hence, for all λ ∈ σ(Aˆ), we have
Σ(fOd ◦ gOd)(λ) = g(f(λ)) = Σ(gOd)(f(λ)) = Σ(gOd)(Σ(fOd)(λ)) = Σ(gOd) ◦Σ(fOd)(λ)
(2.7)
so that
Σ(fOd ◦ gOd) = Σ(gOd) ◦Σ(fOd) (2.8)
as required. Thus Σ is a contravariant functor from Od to Set, and hence a presheaf on
Od.
The key remark now is the following. As discussed in the Appendix, a global section,
or global element , of a contravariant functor X : C → Set is defined to be a function γ
that assigns to each object A in the category C an element γA ∈ X(A) in such a way that
if f : B → A then X(f)(γA) = γB, as in Eq. (A.22).
In the case of the spectral functor Σ : Oopd → Set, a global section/element is therefore
a function γ that assigns to each self-adjoint operator Aˆ with a purely discrete spectrum,
a real number γA ∈ σ(Aˆ) such that if Bˆ = f(Aˆ) then f(γA) = γB. But this is precisely
the condition FUNC in Eq. (1.4) for a valuation! Thus, for operators with a discrete
spectrum, the Kochen-Specker theorem is equivalent to the statement that, if dimH > 2,
there are no global sections of the spectral presheaf Σ : Oopd → Set.
The situation for operators whose spectra contains continuous parts is more complex
since it is no longer necessarily true that σ(f(Aˆ)) = f(σ(Aˆ). Indeed, the most that can
be proved in general8 is that
σ(f(Aˆ)) =
⋂
∆
{f(∆) | Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] = 1ˆ} (2.9)
8For details see page 900 of [19].
where f(∆) is the topological closure of f(∆) ⊂ IR, and ∆ denotes Borel subsets of
IR. The idea of the spectral presheaf can be extended to this case by using a more so-
phisticated approach that involves the spectral theorem for commutative von Neumann
algebras. However, we shall not develop this particular approach further in the present
paper because of the problematic physical meaning of assigning an exact value to a quan-
tity whose range of values is continuous. Of much greater relevance is the assignment of
truth-false values to propositions of the type ‘A ∈ ∆’, as discussed in Section 1 and in the
original Kochen-Specker paper: as we shall see shortly in Section 2.3, the relevant presheaf
in this case can be defined for the category O of all bounded self-adjoint operators on the
Hilbert space of the quantum system.
Note that, in the form above, the Kochen-Specker theorem looks remarkably like the
theorem in fibre-bundle theory which says that there are no global cross-sections of a
non-trivial principal bundle [20]. Thus, cum grano salis, one might be tempted to say
that the Kochen-Specker theorem in quantum theory is analogous to the ‘Gribov effect’
in Yang-Mills gauge theories (which arises from the non-triviality of the gauge bundle)!
More seriously, the non-triviality of a principal fibre bundle is related to the existence
of certain non-vanishing cohomology classes that arise as obstructions to the step-wise
construction of a cross-section on the simplices of a locally-trivializing triangulation of the
base manifold. It would be intriguing to see if the non-existence of global valuations in
the quantum theory can be related to the non-vanishing of some topos-based cohomology
structure. If so, this would open an perspective on the Kochen-Specker theorem that
would be extremely interesting; not least because most of the existing literature on the
theorem is concerned with finding concrete counter-examples to the existence of a global
valuation rather than studying the phenomenon in a general sense.
However, from our immediate perspective the most important reason for presenting
this topos-theoretic restatement of the Kochen-Specker theorem is that, as we shall see,
it suggests specific ways of implementing the idea of constructing generalized valuations;
particularly in regard to using the contextual logic that forms the heart of the theory of
presheaves.
2.3 The Kochen-Specker Theorem in Terms of the Dual Presheaves
on W and on O.
1. The Dual Presheaf on W: The Kochen-Specker theorem is usually stated in
terms of the features of a valuation on the Boolean subalgebras of the lattice P(H) of
projectors on the Hilbert space H. This is useful for handling operators whose spectra
contain continuous parts; it is also the starting point for most constructions of explicit
counter-examples to the existence of global valuations. For these reasons, it is very useful
to restate, and extend, the results above using the category W rather than Od. This will
enable us in Section 2.3.2 to state the Kochen-Specker theorem in terms of the category
O of all bounded self-adjoint operators.
Once again we start with the definition of an appropriate presheaf; this time on the
category W.
Definition 2.3 The dual presheaf on W is the contravariant functor D : W → Set
defined as follows:
1. On objects: D(W ) is the dual of W ; thus it is the set Hom(W, {0, 1}) of all homo-
morphisms from the Boolean algebra W to the Boolean algebra {0, 1}.
2. On morphisms: If iW2W1 : W2 → W1 then D(iW2W1) : D(W1) → D(W2) is defined
by D(iW2W1)(χ) := χ|W2 where χ|W2 denotes the restriction of χ ∈ D(W1) to the
subalgebra W2 ⊆W1.
A global section of the functor D : W → Set is then a function γ that associates
to each W ∈ W an element γW of the dual of W such that if iW2W1 : W2 → W1 then
γW1|W2 = γW2; thus, for all αˆ ∈W2,
γW2(αˆ) = γW1((iW2W1(αˆ)). (2.10)
Since each projection operator belongs to at least one Boolean algebra (for example,
the algebra {0ˆ, 1ˆ, αˆ,¬αˆ}) it follows that a global section of D : Wop → Set associates to
each projection operator αˆ a number V (αˆ) which is either 0 or 1, and is such that, if αˆ∧βˆ =
0ˆ, then V (αˆ∨ βˆ) = V (αˆ)+V (βˆ). These are precisely the types of valuation considered in
the discussions of the Kochen-Specker theorem that focus on the construction of specific
counter-examples. Thus an alternative way of expressing the Kochen-Specker theorem is
that, if dimH > 2, the dual presheaf D :Wop → Set has no global sections.
2. The Dual Presheaf on O: The covariant functor W : O → W of Definition 2.1
and the contravariant functor D : W → Set, can be composed to give a contravariant
functor D◦W : O → Set, which we shall call the dual presheaf on O. It has the following
properties:
1. On objects: D◦W(Aˆ) is the dual of the spectral Boolean algebra WA; thus it is the
set Hom(WA, {0, 1}) of all homomorphisms from WA to the Boolean algebra {0, 1}.
2. On morphisms: If fO : Bˆ → Aˆ then D ◦W(fO) : D(WA) → D(WB) is defined by
D◦W(fO)(χ) := χ|Wf(A) where χ|Wf(A) denotes the restriction of χ ∈ D(WA) to the
subalgebra Wf(A) ⊆WA.
Note that a global section γ of the presheaf D ◦W : O → Set would correspond to a
consistent association of each physical quantity A with an element γA ∈ Hom(WA, {0, 1}),
and hence with a statement of which propositions of the form ‘A ∈ ∆’ are true, and
which are false. The non-existence of such global sections is perhaps the most physically
transparent statement of the Kochen-Specker theorem in the language of presheaves.
Finally, we note that, as might be expected, there is a close relationship between the
spectral presheaf Σ on Od and the corresponding dual presheaf D◦W on Od. Specifically,
there is a natural transformation T : Σ → D ◦W between these presheaves, whose
component TA : Σ(Aˆ)→ D ◦W(Aˆ) at each stage Aˆ ∈ Od,
TA : σ(Aˆ)→ Hom(WA, {0, 1}) (2.11)
is defined by (where λ ∈ σ(Aˆ))
TA(λ)(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) :=
{
1 if λ ∈ ∆
0 otherwise
(2.12)
for all projection operators Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ∈WA.
3 From Partial Valuations to Generalized Valuations
3.1 Some Implications of the Presheaf Version of the Kochen-
Specker Theorem
We are now ready to begin the presentation of our theory of generalized valuations. From
a pedagogical perspective, this could be done in several ways. One possibility would be
to start with the formal definition and then to exhibit some physically relevant examples.
However, although the definition of a generalized valuation is partly motivated by the
conclusions of our earlier discussion in Section 1.3, one of the central components—the
presheaf analogue of the functional composition principle FUNC—is best justified by
seeing how it arises in a particular case. Therefore, we shall devote this section to a fairly
extensive discussion of a concrete example of a particular class of generalized valuation
that will serve to illustrate the ideas that lie behind our later, more abstract, constructions
in Sections 4 and 5.
As we have seen, the Kochen-Specker theorem asserts that, if dimH > 2, there do not
exist valuations that are globally defined in the sense that FUNC is satisfied for all pairs
of operators Aˆ, Bˆ (with discrete spectra) in the Hilbert space with Bˆ = f(Aˆ) for some f ;
or, in the language of topos theory, the spectral presheaf Σ : Odop → Set has no global
sections. More generally, the theorem asserts that there are no global sections of the dual
presheaf D ◦W on O; and hence there is no consistent way of assigning the values true
or false to propositions of the type ‘A ∈ ∆’ for all bounded physical quantities A.
Rewriting the Kochen-Specker theorem in the language of topos theory suggests several
ways in which the idea of a valuation might be generalized so that globally-defined entities
do exist. For example, one possibility is to embed the spectral presheaf Σ in a larger
presheaf that does have global elements. The existence of at least one such presheaf
follows from some general considerations in topos theory9: in the present case, a relevant
example is the presheaf onO whose objects are subsets of σ(Aˆ) at each stage of truth Aˆ. A
global section of this presheaf would comprise a consistent assignment of a range of values
for each physical quantity. This option sounds physically plausible, and is something to
which we may return in a later paper.
Another possibility is to replace the dual presheaf D ◦W on O with a presheaf H in
which H(Aˆ) is defined to be the set of homomorphisms from WA into some larger algebra
than the {0, 1} used by D ◦W, thus building in the idea of multi-valued truth in a rather
9The existence of injective resolutions of a presheaf.
direct way. Of course, guided by our remarks in the Introduction, this target logic could
itself depend on the stage of truth Aˆ (i.e., it could be contextual), and it is not clear that
we would want to use genuine homomorphisms; for example, if the target algebra was an
intuitionistic logic, then the negation operation would behave differently from that inWA,
as was mentioned briefly in the Introduction in the context of the (incorrect!) equation
Eq. (1.12). We shall see an example of this type of structure in Section 5 in the form of
the ‘valuation presheaf’ of Definition 5.2.
However, in this Section, we will take our departure from the property of presheaves
that even if a global section/element does not exist, typically there will be plenty of local
sections (just as there are in a non-trivial principal bundle), which are defined to be
morphisms of a subobject of the terminal object into the presheaf. In the case of the
spectral presheaf Σ, any such local element corresponds to what we shall call a ‘partial’
valuation, and the main thrust of this section of the paper is to show how each such
locally-defined normal valuation (‘normal’ in the sense that assigned values lie in the
minimal Boolean algebra {0, 1}) gives rise to a globally defined ‘generalized’ valuation
with truth-values in the Heyting algebra of sieves on O. This also allows comparison to
be made with the various modal approaches to the interpretation of quantum theory, all
of which use local valuations of one type or another; however, we shall not pursue that
comparison in this paper.
3.2 The Idea of a Partial Valuation
The precise definition of a ‘partial valuation’ is that it is a local section of the spectral
presheaf Σ on the category Od of bounded self-adjoint operators with discrete spectra.
This translates into the following explicit set of properties:
Definition 3.1 A partial valuation on the set of bounded, self-adjoint operators with
discrete spectra is a map V : domV → IR defined on a subset domV of such operators
(called the domain of V ) such that:
1. If Aˆ ∈ domV , then V (Aˆ) ∈ σ(Aˆ).
2. If Aˆ ∈ domV and Bˆ = f(Aˆ) then (i) Bˆ ∈ domV ; and (ii) V (Bˆ) = f(V (Aˆ)).
One consequence of this definition is that if Aˆ belongs to the domain of V , then so do all
its spectral projectors. This is because any such projector Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] can be written as
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] = χ∆(Aˆ) (3.1)
where χ∆ : σ(Aˆ)→ IR is the characteristic function of ∆ ⊆ σ(Aˆ). It follows that
V (Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) = χ∆(V (Aˆ)) =
{
1 if V (Aˆ) ∈ ∆;
0 otherwise.
(3.2)
Note that, provided domV 6= ∅, real multiples of the unit operator 1ˆ belong to the
domain of any partial valuation V . This is because if Aˆ is any operator in domV , then
r1ˆ = cr(Aˆ) where cr : σ(Aˆ)→ IR, r ∈ IR, is the constant map cr(a) := r for all a ∈ σ(Aˆ).
This also shows that V (1ˆ) = 1.
The definition of a partial valuation is not empty since there clearly exists a ‘trivial’
example V0 whose domain is defined as domV0 := {r1ˆ | r ∈ IR}, and with V0(r1ˆ) := r.
However, non-trivial partial valuations also exist. For example, we have the following
definition:
Definition 3.2 Let Mˆ be any bounded, self-adjoint operator with a purely discrete spec-
trum, and let m ∈ σ(Mˆ) be one its eigenvalues. Then the associated partial valuation
V M,m is defined as follows:
1. The domain of V M,m is
domV M,m :=↓Mˆ := {fOd : Aˆ→ Mˆ} = {Aˆ | ∃f s.t. Aˆ = f(Mˆ)}, (3.3)
where the last equality holds since there is at most one morphism between two objects
in Od.
2. If Aˆ ∈ domV M,m with Aˆ = f(Mˆ), then the value of V M,m(Aˆ) is
V M,m(Aˆ) := f(m). (3.4)
It is straightforward to check that this satisfies the requirements for a partial valuation.
Note that, generally speaking, a partial valuation of this type can be extended ‘up-
wards’ in the sense that if there is a morphism hOd : Mˆ → Nˆ , so that Mˆ = h(Nˆ), then
V M,m can be extended to Nˆ by defining V M,m(Nˆ) to be any eigenvalue n of Nˆ such that
h(n) = m (there must be at least one such eigenvalue since σ(Mˆ) = h(σ(Nˆ))). Therefore,
one might as well suppose in the first place that Mˆ is a maximal operator10.
The domain of a valuation V M,m forms a commutative set of operators; however,
there is no reason in general why the domain of a partial valuation should be commuta-
tive. For example, the use of a non-abelian domain forms an integral part of the modal
interpretation of Clifton and Bub [8, 21, 12].
We note that a partial valuation V gives a simple ‘false-true’ assignment to propositions
of the type ‘A ∈ ∆’ provided that A lies in the domain of V ; specifically:
V (A ∈ ∆) :=
{
‘true’ if V (A) ∈ ∆;
‘false’ otherwise.
(3.5)
Thus the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ is true if A lies in the domain of V , and if the value of A
lies in the range ∆; it is false, if A lies in the domain of V and the value of A does not
lie in ∆. If A is not in the domain of V , no truth-value at all is assigned to propositions
about the value of A. Of course, these assignments are consistent with the assignment in
Eq. (3.2) of a 0− 1 value to the projection operator Eˆ[A ∈ ∆].
10In the present context, we could define an operator Mˆ to be maximal if, for any operator Nˆ and
function h : σ(Nˆ ) → IR such that Mˆ = h(Nˆ), there exists g : σ(Mˆ) → IR such that Nˆ = g(Mˆ); i.e.,
hO : Mˆ → Nˆ implies that Mˆ and Nˆ are isomorphic objects in the category O.
3.3 The Construction of a Generalized Valuation from a Partial
Valuation
1. The Basic Idea: Let V be any partial valuation, and consider a proposition of the
form ‘A = a’, where a is an eigenvalue of Aˆ and where Aˆ does not lie in the domain of V .
The implication of the Kochen-Specker theorem is that it may not be possible to extend
the domain of V to include Aˆ. If this is indeed the case, then the proposition ‘A = a’
cannot be given a value true or false in a way that is consistent with the values already
given by V to the operators in its domain.
However, consider a proposition of the form ‘f(A) = f(a)’. As was emphasized earlier,
this will generally be weaker than ‘A = a’; both in a conceptual sense—knowing that the
quantity f(A) has the value f(a) gives only limited information on the value of A itself
(it could be any number b such that f(b) = f(a))—and in the mathematical sense that,
in the lattice of projection operators, (cf., Eq. (1.8)),
Eˆ[A = a] ≤ Eˆ[f(A) = f(a)] (3.6)
where Eˆ[A = a] projects onto the eigenspace of Aˆ with eigenvalue a, and Eˆ[f(A) = f(a)]
projects onto the eigenspace of f(Aˆ) with eigenvalue f(a). More precisely
Eˆ[f(A) = f(a)] =
∑
b∈σ(A),f(b)=f(a)
Eˆ[A = b] = Eˆ[A ∈ f−1(f({a}))]. (3.7)
In other words, Eˆ[f(A) = f(a)] is the sum of the (orthogonal) set of those projectors
in the spectral decomposition of Aˆ whose corresponding eigenvalues are mapped into the
number f(a) by the function f : σ(Aˆ)→ IR.
The key remark is then the following. It is possible that, for one (or more) function f ,
(i) the coarse-grained operator f(Aˆ) does lies in the domain of V (i.e., at least part of the
spectral algebra of Aˆ lies in domV ); and (ii) V (f(Aˆ)) = f(a). Under these circumstances,
we can assign a true value to the weaker proposition ‘f(A) = f(a)’, and thereby assign a
partial truth-value to the original proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’. We note that if g : σ(f(Aˆ))→ IR
then V (g(f(Aˆ))) = g(f(a))—i.e., V (g ◦ f(Aˆ)) = g ◦ f(a)—and hence if the function f
satisfies the above conditions, so does g ◦ f for any g; in other words, the set of such
functions determines a sieve on Aˆ in the category Od.
Motivated by these remarks, we propose the following definition of a generalized val-
uation associated with a partial valuation.
Definition 3.3 Given a partial valuation V on the set of bounded self-adjoint operators
with discrete spectra, the associated generalized valuation is defined on a proposition ‘A =
a’ as
νV (A = a) :=


{fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ | Bˆ ∈ domV, V (Bˆ) = f(a)} if a ∈ σ(Aˆ);
∅ otherwise. (3.8)
A crucial consequence of this definition is that, as indicated above, νV (A = a) is a sieve
on Aˆ in the categoryOd. Indeed, suppose fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ belongs to νV (A = a), and consider
any morphism gOd : Cˆ → Bˆ. Then, since Bˆ ∈ domV , and Cˆ = g(Bˆ), the definition of
a partial valuation shows that (i) Cˆ ∈ domV , and (ii) V (Cˆ) = g(V (Bˆ)). However,
g(V (Bˆ)) = g(f(a)) = g ◦ f(a); and hence V (Cˆ) = g ◦ f(a). Thus fOd ◦ gOd : Cˆ → Aˆ is in
the set νV (A = a), which is therefore a sieve.
Thus the partial truth-value νV (A = a) of the proposition ‘A = a’ is defined to be
the sieve on Aˆ of coarse-grainings f(Aˆ) of Aˆ, at which the proposition ‘f(A) = f(a)’ is
‘totally’ true according to the partial valuation V .
2. The Origin of Contextuality: The fact that νV (A = a) is a sieve is of considerable
importance since it shows that the target space of the valuation νV (A = a) is a genuine
mathematical logic: namely, the Heyting algebra Ω(Aˆ) of sieves on the object Aˆ in the
category Od.
In more general terms, the sieve-like nature of the generalized valuation gives strong
support to our claim that topos theory is the appropriate mathematical framework in
which to develop these ideas. This is particularly so in regard to the presheaf idea of
‘contextual’ logic. From the defining property of a generalized valuation in Eq. (3.8), it
is clear that if the propositions ‘A = a’ and ‘C = c’ happen to correspond to the same
projection operator Pˆ , so that Eˆ[A = a] = Eˆ[C = c] = Pˆ , this does not mean that
νV (A = a) is equal to νV (C = c); indeed, the former is a sieve on Aˆ, whilst the latter
is a sieve on Cˆ. Furthermore, if the projection operator Pˆ is thought of as representing
some physical quantity P directly, then the proposition ‘P = 1’ can also be assigned a
partial truth-value νV (P = 1); which, as a sieve on Pˆ , is different from both νV (A = a)
and νV (C = c).
The situation can be summarized by saying that if we think of ourselves as assigning
partial truth-values to projection operators, then the actual value assigned to any specific
projector Pˆ will depend on the context chosen—i.e., we have to choose a particular self-
adjoint operator Aˆ from the set of all operators whose associated sets of spectral projectors
include Pˆ ; hence each context corresponds to a ‘stage of truth’ for the presheaf.
Thus we see that, in the notation ‘νV (A = a)’, the argument ‘A = a’ serves two
purposes: (i) it specifies the associated projection operator Eˆ[A = a]; and (ii) it indicates
the context (i.e., Aˆ) in which a partial truth-value is to be ascribed to this projector.
This manifest contextuality is one of the crucial features that distinguishes our scheme
from a naive one in which one tries simply to assign to each projector the value 1 or 0—an
attempt that immediately falls foul of the Kochen-Specker theorem.
If desired, this situation can be reflected in the notation by rewriting νV (A = a) as
νVA (Pˆ ) to emphasize that the former can be construed as the partial truth-value assigned
to the projection operator Pˆ (= Eˆ[A = a]) in the context/stage of truth of the self-adjoint
operator Aˆ. Notice that, as is characteristic of presheaf logic, the Heyting algebra to which
νVA (Pˆ ) belongs itself depends on the context Aˆ; namely, it is the algebra Ω(Aˆ) of sieves
on Aˆ.
3. Extending to Propositions ‘A ∈ ∆’: The construction above of a generalized
valuation can be extended in an obvious way to include more general propositions of
the form ‘A ∈ ∆’, where ∆ is any Borel11 subset of the spectrum σ(Aˆ). Note that the
set of these propositions is naturally equipped with the logical structure of the Boolean
algebra of all Borel subsets of σ(Aˆ); in the quantum theory, this algebra is represented
by the spectral algebra WA of projectors onto the eigenspaces associated with these Borel
subsets.
Specifically, we define:
Definition 3.4 Given a partial valuation V , the associated generalized valuation is de-
fined on a proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ as
νV (A ∈ ∆) := {fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ | Bˆ ∈ domV, V (Bˆ) ∈ f(∆)} (3.9)
It is a straightforward exercise to show that the right hand side is a sieve on Aˆ in the
category Od.
4. ‘Totally true’ and ‘Totally false’: This is a convenient point at which to give a
precise meaning to the concepts ‘totally true’ and ‘totally false’ that have been employed
up to now in a rather heuristic way. These concepts, too, are contextual in nature.
The formal definition is as follows:
Definition 3.5
1. The proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ is totally true at the stage of truth Aˆ if
νV (A ∈ ∆) = trueA := ↓Aˆ = {fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ}. (3.10)
2. The proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ is totally false at the stage of truth Aˆ if
νV (A ∈ ∆) = falseA := ∅. (3.11)
Thus a proposition is totally true in the context Aˆ if its partial truth-value is equal to
the principal sieve on Aˆ, which is the unit element in the Heyting algebra Ω(Aˆ); the
proposition is totally false if it is equal to the empty sieve, which is the zero element in
Ω(Aˆ).
Note that if νV (A = a) =↓Aˆ, then, in particular, the identity morphism idA : Aˆ→ Aˆ
belongs to the sieve νV (A = a). According to the Definition 3.3 this means that (i) Aˆ ∈
domV , and (ii) V (Aˆ) = a. Conversely, if Aˆ ∈ domV and V (Aˆ) = a then νV (A = a) =↓Aˆ.
Thus the proposition ‘A = a’ is totally true if, and only if, νV (A = a) = trueA. Hence
the notion of total truth of the proposition ‘A = a’ captures precisely the idea that the
quantity A does indeed have a value, and that value is a.
More generally, νV (A ∈ ∆) = trueA if, and only if, A lies in the domain of V , and the
value of A assigned by V lies in the subset ∆ ⊆ σ(Aˆ).
11Note that any subset of the spectrum of an operator in Od is Borel, and hence the qualification is
unnecessary. However, we shall leave in references to ‘Borel’ subsets as this is of importance for operators
whose spectra is not just discrete.
5. Possible Modification of Od to Remove Minimal Truth-Values: As things
stand, if ∆ 6= ∅, the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ is never totally false since, as mentioned in
Section 3.2, real multiples of the unit operator 1ˆ belongs to the domain of any partial
valuation, and so crOd : r1ˆ→ Aˆ with V (r1ˆ) = r = cr(a) for all a ∈ σ(Aˆ), is bound to be
in νV (A ∈ ∆) if ∆ 6= ∅. Thus the morphism crOd : r1ˆ → Aˆ always belongs to the sieve
νV (A ∈ ∆) provided only that ∆ is not the empty set.
If ν(A ∈ ∆) = {crOd : r1ˆ→ A | r ∈ IR} then we will say that the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’
is minimally true; that is, it really provides no interesting information about the value of
A. If desired, the existence of such minimal truth-values can be removed by the simple
expedient of replacing the category Od with the category Od∗, which is defined to be Od
minus (i) the objects r1ˆ, r ∈ IR, and (ii) all morphisms that have these objects as domains.
Clearly there is a precise analogue of this construction for the category O of all bounded,
self-adjoint operators on H. The analogous modification of the category W consists in
removing the trivial Boolean algebra {0, 1} as a possible context/stage of truth; we shall
denote the resulting category by W∗.
Whether or not one wants to make the change from O to O∗ is not totally clear, and
for the moment we prefer to keep the two options open as two slightly different schemes.
Most of the material that follows is valid irrespective of whether O or O∗ is used; where
there is a significant difference, we shall point it out.
6. The Analogue of FUNC: Let us turn now to the crucial question of the analogue
of the functional composition condition FUNC; in particular, we must check that if the
proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ is given the value ‘totally true’ then, in an appropriate sense, this
is also the case for the proposition ‘h(A) ∈ h(∆)’ for any bounded Borel function h :
σ(Aˆ)→ IR. The following theorem provides the key to seeing that this is so.
Theorem 3.1 If hOd : Cˆ → Aˆ, so that Cˆ = h(Aˆ), then
νV (C ∈ h(∆)) = h∗Od(νV (A ∈ ∆)) (3.12)
where the pull-back h∗Od(S) of S ∈ Ω(Aˆ) by hOd : Cˆ → Aˆ is the sieve on Cˆ defined as (cf.,
Eq. (A.11))
h∗Od(S) := {kOd : Dˆ → Cˆ | hOd ◦ kOd ∈ S}. (3.13)
Proof
We have
νV (C ∈ h(∆)) := {kOd : Dˆ → Cˆ | Dˆ ∈ domV, V (Dˆ) ∈ k(h(∆))} (3.14)
and so, since Cˆ = h(Aˆ), if kOd ∈ νV (C ∈ h(∆)) then hOd ◦ kOd : Dˆ → Aˆ with Dˆ ∈ domV
and V (Dˆ) ∈ k ◦ h(∆); hence hOd ◦ kOd ∈ νV (A ∈ ∆), so that kOd ∈ h∗Od(νV (A ∈ ∆)).
Thus νV (C ∈ h(∆)) ⊆ h∗Od(νV (A ∈ ∆)).
Conversely, let kOd : Dˆ → Cˆ belong to h∗Od(νV (A ∈ ∆)); thus hOd ◦ kOd ∈ νV (A ∈ ∆).
Then Dˆ ∈ domV , and V (Dˆ) ∈ k(h(∆)), and so kOd ∈ νV (C ∈ h(∆)). Hence h∗Od(νV (A ∈
∆)) ⊆ νV (C ∈ h(∆)). Q.E.D.
In particular, suppose that νV (A ∈ ∆) has the value ‘totally true’, i.e., it is equal to
the unit 1A =↓Aˆ (or ‘trueA’) of the Heyting algebra Ω(Aˆ) of sieves on Aˆ. Then
h∗Od(ν
V (A ∈ ∆)) = h∗Od(↓Aˆ) =↓Cˆ (3.15)
and so, by Eq. (3.12), we get νV (C ∈ h(∆)) =↓C = 1C ; hence the proposition ‘C ∈ h(∆)’
has the value ‘totally true’ in the Heyting algebra of sieves on Cˆ.
In summary: if the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ is totally true at the stage of truth Aˆ, then
the weaker proposition ‘h(A) ∈ h(∆)’ is also totally true at the stage of truth h(Aˆ). This
result is precisely the type of thing we wanted, and justifies our taking Eq. (3.12) to be
the presheaf analogue of the functional composition rule.
Furthermore, the pull-back of a sieve by a morphism that is itself a member of the
sieve, is the principal sieve (see the discussion around Eq. (A.12) in the Appendix). Thus
Eq. (3.12) implies that the partial truth-value of a proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ is the set of
coarse-grainings of Aˆ which are such that the associated propositions are totally true at
their own ‘stages of truth’.
3.4 Algebraic Properties of the Generalized Valuation νV
Let us consider now the extent to which the generalized valuation Eq. (3.9) satisfies the
conditions listed in Eqs.(1.13–1.15) in the Introduction. We shall also consider explicitly
the possibility that the generalized valuation might satisfy strong disjunctive or conjunc-
tive conditions.
1. The Null Proposition Condition: The null proposition regarding the value of
the physical quantity A is ‘A ∈ ∅’, and then νV (A ∈ ∅) := {fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ | Bˆ ∈
domV, V (Bˆ) ∈ f(∅)}. But f(∅) = ∅, and hence νV (A ∈ ∅) = ∅, which is the zero
element of the Heyting algebra Ω(Aˆ). Hence, as required, νV (0) = 0A; or, to indicate the
context in a more precise way,
νVA (0ˆ) = 0A. (3.16)
2. The Monotonicity Condition: To check monotonicity we consider propositions
‘A ∈ ∆1’ and ‘A ∈ ∆2’ with ∆1 ⊆ ∆2, which is equivalent to the propositional relation
‘A ∈ ∆1 ≤ A ∈ ∆2’.
Then if fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ belongs to νV (A ∈ ∆1), we have Bˆ ∈ domV and V (Bˆ) ∈ f(∆1).
However, ∆1 ⊆ ∆2 implies f(∆1) ⊆ f(∆2); and hence V (Bˆ) ∈ f(∆2). Thus fOd also
belongs to νV (A ∈ ∆2). This proves the monotonicity condition
‘A ∈ ∆1 ≤ A ∈ ∆2’ implies νV (A ∈ ∆1) ≤ νV (A ∈ ∆2). (3.17)
2.1 A Strong Disjunctive Condition: As noted in Section 1.3, the monotonicity
condition implies the weak disjunctive and conjunctive conditions
νV (A ∈ ∆1) ∨ νV (A ∈ ∆2) ≤ νV (A ∈ ∆1 ∨ A ∈ ∆2) (3.18)
and
νV (A ∈ ∆1 ∧A ∈ ∆2) ≤ νV (A ∈ ∆1) ∧ νV (A ∈ ∆2) (3.19)
respectively.
However, it turns out that νV satisfies a strong disjunctive condition in which the
inequality in Eq. (3.18) is replaced by an equality.
To see this, consider propositions ‘A ∈ ∆1’ and ‘A ∈ ∆2’, so that ‘A ∈ ∆1∨A ∈ ∆2’ is
the equivalent to the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆1 ∪∆2’, (i.e., the logical ‘∨’ operation is taken in
the Boolean algebra of propositions about the value of A lying in Borel subsets of σ(Aˆ)).
Then
νV (A ∈ ∆1 ∨A ∈ ∆2) := {fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ | Bˆ ∈ domV, V (Bˆ) ∈ f(∆1 ∪∆2)} (3.20)
which, since f(∆1 ∪∆2) = f(∆1) ∪ f(∆2), gives
νV (A ∈ ∆1 ∨ A ∈ ∆2) = {fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ | Bˆ ∈ domV, V (Bˆ) ∈ f(∆1), or V (Bˆ) ∈ f(∆2)}.
(3.21)
However, the right hand side of this expression is just νV (A ∈ ∆1) ∪ νV (A ∈ ∆2). Thus
we see that
νV (A ∈ ∆1 ∨A ∈ ∆2) = νV (A ∈ ∆1) ∨ νV (A ∈ ∆2) (3.22)
where the ‘∨’-operation on the right hand side is taken in the Heyting algebra Ω(Aˆ), and
where we recall from Eq. (A.16) that if S1 and S2 are sieves on the same object, then
S1 ∨ S2 := S1 ∪ S2. Thus, the generalized valuation νV satisfies a disjunctive condition in
the strong sense that the equality holds. As we shall see later , this is not the case for
other types of generalized valuation (see the discussion around Eqs. (4.48–4.50) in Section
4.4).
2.2 No Strong Conjunctive Condition: One might wonder if there is not a strong
version of the conjunctive condition too, in which the inequality in Eq. (3.19)—which
comes purely from monotonicity—is replaced by an equality.
To check this, we note that the conjunction ‘A ∈ ∆1 ∧ A ∈ ∆2’ = ‘A ∈ ∆1 ∩ ∆2’,
receives the truth-value
νV (A ∈ ∆1 ∧A ∈ ∆2) := {fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ | Bˆ ∈ domV, V (Bˆ) ∈ f(∆1 ∩∆2)} (3.23)
whereas
νV (A ∈ ∆1) ∧ νV (A ∈ ∆2) = νV (A ∈ ∆1) ∩ νV (A ∈ ∆2) :=
{fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ | Bˆ ∈ domV, V (Bˆ) ∈ f(∆1) and V (Bˆ) ∈ f(∆2)} (3.24)
where we have used the definition in Eq. (A.15) that if S1 and S2 are sieves on the same
object, then S1 ∧ S2 := S1 ∩ S2.
However f(∆1 ∩∆2) ⊆ f(∆1)∩ f(∆2), and the equality may not hold if f is many-to-
one. Thus the most that can be deduced from Eqs. (3.23–3.24) is that νV (A ∈ ∆1∩∆2) ⊆
νV (A ∈ ∆1) ∩ νV (A ∈ ∆2), which gives only the inequality
νV (A ∈ ∆1 ∧A ∈ ∆2) ≤ νV (A ∈ ∆1) ∧ νV (A ∈ ∆2) (3.25)
that could have been derived directly from the monotonicity result in Eq. (3.17).
As anticipated in the Introduction (the discussion in Section 1.3), there are good rea-
sons for expecting the strict equality not to hold. For example, consider the propositions
‘A ∈ {a1}’ and ‘A ∈ {a2}’ with a1 6= a2. Then
νV (A ∈ {a1} ∩ {a2}) = νV (A ∈ ∅) = ∅ (3.26)
whereas
νV (A ∈ {a1}) ∧ νV (A ∈ {a2}) = {fOd : Bˆ → A | Bˆ ∈ domV, V (Bˆ) = f(a1) = f(a2)}
(3.27)
and there is no reason for this to be the empty set, or even to be just minimally true:
all that is necessary is that there is some nontrivial function f : σ(Aˆ) → IR such that
f(Aˆ) ∈ domV and f(a1) = f(a2). Thus, in this special ‘topos’ sense, a physical quantity
can have more than one partial value at once!
3. The Exclusivity Condition: It is necessary to check the exclusivity condition since
this cannot be derived directly from the monotonicity result in Eq. (3.17).
So, suppose that νV (A ∈ ∆1) = trueA =↓ Aˆ, and that ∆2 is such that ∆1 ∩ ∆2 = ∅.
Then, from the definition of νV , it follows that idA belongs to the sieve ν
V (A ∈ ∆1), and
hence Aˆ ∈ domV and V (Aˆ) ∈ ∆1. Therefore, since ∆1∩∆2 = ∅, we have V (Aˆ) /∈ ∆2, and
hence idA is not a member of the sieve ν
V (A ∈ ∆2). This does not mean that νV (A ∈ ∆2)
is equal to falseA (= ∅), but it does make it strictly less than trueA. Thus we have shown
that if A ∈ ∆1 and A ∈ ∆2 are disjoint propositions, and if νV (A ∈ ∆) = trueA, then
νA(A ∈ ∆2) < trueA; hence exclusivity is satisfied.
4. No Unit Proposition Condition: The unit proposition in the Boolean algebra of
propositions about A is simply ‘A ∈ σ(Aˆ)’, and a priori one might expect that this is
always given the value ‘trueA’, so that there is a unit analogue of the null condition Eq.
(3.16). We shall refer to this as the ‘unit proposition condition’, and state it formally as:
Unit Proposition Condition: For all stages of truth Aˆ
ν(A ∈ σ(Aˆ)) = trueA (3.28)
or, in the alternative notation for valuations on projection operators,
νA(1ˆ) = trueA. (3.29)
However, in fact, this is not necessarily satisfied by the generalized valuation νV .
Indeed, from the definition of νV we see at once that
νV (A ∈ σ(Aˆ)) := {fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ | Bˆ ∈ domV, V (Bˆ) ∈ f(σ(Aˆ))}
= {fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ | Bˆ ∈ domV } (3.30)
where the last equality holds since, for these discrete-spectra operators, f(σ(Aˆ)) = σ(Bˆ),
which means that V (Bˆ) is always an element of the set f(σ(Aˆ)). Thus
νV (A ∈ σ(Aˆ)) = domV ∩ ↓Aˆ (3.31)
which could well be a proper subset of the sieve trueA :=↓Aˆ. Thus, in this situation, even
the proposition ‘A has some value’ is not totally true! Rather, the partial truth-value of
this proposition is a measure of the ‘proximity’ of the observable A to the domain of the
partial valuation. Borrowing a standard piece of nomenclature from topos theory, one
could say that the physical quantity A only ‘partially exists’ in this situation. As we shall
see in Section 4.3, the unit proposition condition is satisfied by the generalized valuation
associated with a quantum state.
4 Generalized Valuations and Quantum States
Motivated by Definition 3.3 as an example of a sieve-valued generalized valuation, and
by the properties of these valuations, we turn now in Section 4.1 to the formal definition
of a generalized valuation that is not based on the existence of any partial valuation. In
Section 4.2 we discuss the precise way in which this fits into a topos framework; finally in
Section 4.3 we show how any quantum state gives rise to a generalized valuation.
4.1 The Definition of a Generalized Valuation
Since we wish to apply these methods to the category O of all bounded, self-adjoint
operators, the first step is to give meaning to the projector Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] in those cases
in which f(∆) is not a Borel subset of σ(f(Aˆ)). The main ingredient is the following
theorem (which is also used in Section 5.3):
Theorem 4.1 If ∆ is a Borel subset of σ(Aˆ), and if f : σ(Aˆ) → IR is a Borel function
such that f(∆) is a Borel subset of σ(f(Aˆ)), then if Wf(A) is viewed as a subalgebra of
the Boolean algebra WA we have
Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] = inf{Qˆ ∈Wf(A) ⊆WA | Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Qˆ} (4.1)
where the infinum of projectors is taken in the (complete) lattice structure of P.
Proof
Let Iˆ := inf{Qˆ ∈ Wf(A) ⊆ WA | Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Qˆ}; then, since E[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Eˆ[f(A) ∈
f(∆)], we clearly have Iˆ ≤ Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)].
Conversely, suppose Qˆ ∈ Wf(A) ⊆ WA is such that Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Qˆ. There is some
Borel subset K ⊆ σ(f(Aˆ)) such that Qˆ = Eˆ[f(A) ∈ K], and so Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Eˆ[f(A) ∈ K].
However, Eˆ[f(A) ∈ K] = Eˆ[A ∈ f−1(K)]; and hence the inequality reads Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤
Eˆ[A ∈ f−1(K)], which implies ∆ ⊆ f−1(K) (up to sets of spectral-measure zero), and
hence that f(∆) ⊆ f(f−1(K)) ⊆ J . In turn, this implies that Qˆ = Eˆ[f(A) ∈ K] ≥
Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)]. In summary: Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Qˆ implies that Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] ≤ Qˆ, and
hence Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] ≤ Iˆ. Thus Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] = Iˆ. Q.E.D.
The key idea now is to use the right hand side of Eq. (4.1) as the definition of the
symbol Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] in those cases in which f(∆) is not a Borel subset of σ(f(Aˆ)). In
this context, we note that since Wf(A) is a complete sublattice of P, the right hand side
of Eq. (4.1) is always of the form E[f(A) ∈ J ] for some Borel subset J of σ(f(Aˆ)). Note
also that, considered as a definition of Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)], the expression Eq. (4.1) can be
usefully rewritten as
Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] := inf
K⊆σ(f(Aˆ))
{Eˆ[f(A) ∈ K] | Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Eˆ[f(A) ∈ K]} (4.2)
= inf
K⊆σ(f(Aˆ))
{Eˆ[f(A) ∈ K] | Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Eˆ[A ∈ f−1(K)]} (4.3)
= inf
K⊆σ(f(Aˆ))
{Eˆ[f(A) ∈ K] | ∆ ⊆ f−1(J)} (4.4)
where the infinum is taken over all Borel subsets J of σ(f(Aˆ)). From now on we shall use
Eq. (4.2) as the definition of Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] for the category of operators O.
Equipped with this idea, we can give the definition of a generalized valuation on
propositions about the values of any physical quantity represented by a bounded self-
adjoint operator Aˆ in O:
Definition 4.1 A generalized valuation on the propositions in a quantum theory is a map
ν that associates to each proposition of the form ‘A ∈ ∆’ (where ∆ is a Borel subset of
σ(Aˆ)) a sieve ν(A ∈ ∆) on Aˆ in O. These sieves must satisfy the following properties:
(i) Functional composition:
For any Borel function h : σ(Aˆ)→ IR we have
ν(h(A) ∈ h(∆)) = h∗O(ν(A ∈ ∆)). (4.5)
(ii) Null proposition condition:
ν(A ∈ ∅) = 0A (4.6)
(iii) Monotonicity:
If ∆1 ⊆ ∆2 then ν(A ∈ ∆1) ≤ ν(A ∈ ∆2). (4.7)
(iv) Exclusivity:
If ∆1 ∩∆2 = ∅ and ν(A ∈ ∆1) = trueA, then ν(A ∈ ∆2) < trueA. (4.8)
We may also wish to add the ‘unit proposition condition’:
(v) Unit proposition condition:
ν(A ∈ σ(Aˆ)) = trueA. (4.9)
Note that this definition of a generalized valuation makes sense for operators whose
spectra contains continuous parts, as well as for those whose spectra is purely discrete.
However, in order to give meaning to the proposition ‘h(A) ∈ h(∆)’ in Eq. (4.5) if h(∆) is
not a Borel subset of σ(h(Aˆ)), it is more appropriate to think of a generalized valuation as
being defined on the projectors Eˆ[A ∈ ∆], rather than on the more abstract propositions
‘A ∈ ∆’ themselves; for this enables the definition in Eq. (4.2) to be used.
The physical interpretation of a generalized valuation is motivated by the special
case of the valuations νV discussed in the last section. Namely, the partial truth-value
ν(A ∈ ∆) of the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ is a sieve of coarse-grainings f(Aˆ) of Aˆ, at which each
associated proposition ‘f(A) ∈ f(∆)’ is totally true—reflecting the fact that if fO : Bˆ → Aˆ
belongs to the sieve ν(A ∈ ∆) on Aˆ then, by the definition of a sieve, the pull-back
f ∗Oν(A ∈ ∆) to f(Aˆ) of this sieve is necessarily the principal sieve on f(Aˆ) (see Eq.
(A.12)). In general terms, we can say that the ‘size’ of the sieve ν(A ∈ ∆) determines the
degree of the partial truth of the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’.
We note that, as in the earlier discussion of the generalized valuation νV , the phrase
‘A ∈ ∆’ in ν(A ∈ ∆) performs the dual function of specifying (i) the projection operator
whose partial truth-value is to be given; and (ii) the context—the operator Aˆ—in which
this valuation takes place.
As in the previous section, this contextuality can be made more explicit by shifting
the emphasis to think of valuations as being defined on projection operators in the ex-
plicit context of a specific physical quantity. Then, the truth-value associated with a
specific Pˆ ∈ P depends on the context of a particular self-adjoint operator Aˆ whose set
of spectral projectors WA includes Pˆ . In this manifestly contextual form, the definition
of a generalized valuation would read as follows:
Definition 4.2 A generalized valuation on the lattice of projection operators P in a
quantum theory is a collection of maps νA : WA → Ω(Aˆ), one for each ‘stage of truth’ Aˆ
in the category O, with the following properties:
(i) Functional composition:
For any Borel function h : σ(Aˆ)→ IR,
νh(A)(Eˆ[h(A) ∈ h(∆)]) = h∗O(νA(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]). (4.10)
(ii) Null proposition condition:
νA(0ˆ) = 0A (4.11)
(iii) Monotonicity:
If αˆ, βˆ ∈WA with αˆ ≤ βˆ, then νA(αˆ) ≤ νA(βˆ). (4.12)
(iv) Exclusivity:
If αˆ, βˆ ∈WA with αˆβˆ = 0ˆ and νA(αˆ) = trueA, then νA(βˆ) < trueA. (4.13)
We may wish to supplement this list with:
(v) Unit proposition condition:
νA(1ˆ) = trueA. (4.14)
Note that, in writing Eq. (4.10) we have employed the specific ‘coarse-graining’ func-
tion from the Boolean algebra WA to the Boolean algebra Wh(A), defined by the map
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] 7→ Eˆ[h(A) ∈ h(∆)] (4.15)
where, if necessary, the right hand side is to be understood in the sense of Eq. (4.2). In
Section 5.3 we shall consider a more general way of understanding this operation.
4.2 The Topos Interpretation of Generalized Valuations
1. The Coarse-graining Presheaf: From what has been said so far it should be clear
that ideas of topos theory lie at the heart of our constructions. However, the only explicit
feature that has appeared so far is our use of sieves as truth-values, and we wish now to
explain more fully how our ideas fit in with the theory of presheaves.
A key ingredient in exhibiting the underlying topos framework of generalized valu-
ations is a certain presheaf on O that incorporates our central idea of operator coarse-
graining. This is contained in the following definition.
Definition 4.3 The coarse-graining presheaf over O is the covariant functor G : Oop →
Set defined as follows.
1. On objects in O: G(Aˆ) := WA, where WA is the spectral algebra of Aˆ.
2. On morphisms in O: If fO : Bˆ → Aˆ (i.e., Bˆ = f(Aˆ)), then G(fO) : WA → WB is
defined as
G(fO)(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) := Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] (4.16)
where, if necessary, the right hand side is to be understood in the sense of Eq. (4.2).
Note that G(fO) : WA →Wf(A) is just the coarse-graining operation considered above in
Eq. (4.15).
The main step in proving that G is a contravariant functor from O to Set is to show
that if fO : Bˆ → Aˆ and gO : Cˆ → Bˆ, then G(fO ◦ gO) = G(gO) ◦G(fO), as in Eq. (A.6).
However, G(fO)(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) := Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)], and therefore, if f(∆) and g(f(∆)) are
Borel subsets of the appropriate spectra, then
G(gO)(Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)]) := Eˆ[g(f(A)) ∈ g(f(∆))] (4.17)
while
G(fO ◦ gO)(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) := Eˆ[g(f(A)) ∈ g(f(∆))]. (4.18)
Hence G(fO ◦ gO) = G(gO) ◦G(fO), as desired. If f(∆) or g(f(∆)) are not Borel subsets
then the result follows (using the definition in Eq. (4.2)) as a special case of the result
stated after Definition 5.4.
2. The Natural Transformation Between G and Ω: A key technical result in
revealing the topos content of our constructions is the following.
Theorem 4.2 To each generalized valuation ν on P there corresponds a natural trans-
formation Nν between the contravariant functors G and Ω, in which, at each stage of
truth Aˆ, the component NνA : G(Aˆ)→ Ω(Aˆ) is defined by
NνA(Pˆ ) := νA(Pˆ ) (4.19)
for all Pˆ ∈WA = G(Aˆ).
Proof
We recall that the subobject classifier Ω in the topos SetO
op
is defined (i) on objects by
Ω(Aˆ) := {S | S is a sieve on Aˆ in O}; and (ii) on morphisms fO : Bˆ → Aˆ by Ω(fO) :
Ω(Aˆ)→ Ω(Bˆ) where Ω(fO)(S) := f ∗O(S) for all sieves S ∈ Ω(Aˆ).
As discussed in Section A.2, a natural transformation N between the contravariant
functors G and Ω is defined to be a family of functions NA : G(Aˆ)→ Ω(Aˆ)—one for each
stage of truth Aˆ—such that, if fO : Bˆ → Aˆ, the composite map G(Aˆ) NA−→ Ω(Aˆ) Ω(fO)−→
Ω(Bˆ) is equal to G(Aˆ)
G(fO)−→ G(Bˆ) NB−→ Ω(Bˆ) (cf. the commutative diagram in Eq.
(A.9)).
In our case, if ν is a generalized valuation, the associated natural transformation Nν
is defined at stage Aˆ on G(Aˆ) := WA by N
ν
A(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) := νA(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) ≡ ν(A ∈ ∆).
Then
Ω(fO) ◦NνA(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) = Ω(fO)(NνA(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆])) = f ∗O(νA(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆])) (4.20)
while
NνB ◦G(fO)(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) = NνB(G(fO)(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]))
= NνB(Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)]) = νf(A)(Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)]) (4.21)
However, the functional composition principle Eq. (4.10) says that the right hand sides
of Eq.( 4.20) and Eq. (4.21) are identical, which shows that Ω(fO) ◦ NνA(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) =
NνB ◦G(fO)(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]). Hence Nν is a natural transformation between the contravariant
functors G and Ω. Q.E.D.
Note that, in the language of Definition 4.1, the components of the natural transfor-
mation are NνA(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) := ν(A ∈ ∆).
The next three subsections bring out some of the implicit ‘topos content’ of Theorem
4.2.
3. Another Perspective on the Coarse-Graining Presheaf: There is another
way of looking at the coarse-graining presheaf which may help to clarify its place in the
theory; at least in the case of operators with purely discrete spectra. Associated with
the spectral presheaf Σ : Odop → Set of Definition 2.2 there is another covariant functor
BΣ : Odop → Set, defined as follows:
1. On objects: BΣ(Aˆ) := B(σ(Aˆ))—the Boolean algebra of Borel subsets of the spec-
trum of Aˆ.
2. On morphisms: If fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ, so that Bˆ = f(Aˆ), then BΣ(fOd) : B(σ(Aˆ)) →
B(σ(Bˆ)) is defined by
BΣ(fOd)(∆) := f(∆) (4.22)
for all Borel subsets ∆ ⊆ σ(Aˆ).
Note that the spectral Boolean algebra WA is isomorphic to the Boolean algebra
B(σ(Aˆ)) by the map that associates the projector Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ∈ WA with the Borel subset
∆ ∈ B(σ(Aˆ)). From equations Eq. (4.16) and Eq. (4.22), it is clear therefore that the
coarse-graining presheaf G is essentially the same thing as the ‘power-object’ BΣ.12
4. Generalized Valuations as Subobjects of G: We recall that, in a topos of
presheaves such as SetO
op
, a morphism between a pair of functors (i.e., a pair of objects in
the topos) is defined to be a natural transformation between them. Therefore, Theorem
4.2 implies that to each generalized valuation ν there corresponds a morphism Nν :
G→ Ω between the coarse-graining object G and the subobject classifier Ω in the topos
SetO
op
. However, precisely because Ω is the subobject classifier in this topos, morphisms
G → Ω are in one-to-one correspondence with subobjects of G (see the end of Section
A.2; especially equations Eq. (A.20) and Eq. (A.21)). Thus, we conclude that to every
generalized valuation there corresponds a subobject of the coarse-graining object G; or,
equivalently, of the power object BΣ.
Conversely, of course, we could turn this around and define a generalized valuation to
be any subobject of G, or BΣ, that is subject to the conditions Eqs. (4.11–4.13), or to
the equivalent set Eqs. (4.6–4.8).
One important consequence of looking at a generalized valuation as a certain type
of morphism from G to Ω, comes from the fact that, in any topos, the collection of all
subobjects of a given object has the structure of a Heyting algebra. This is of considerable
interest to us since it raises the possibility that the subset of subobjects that satisfy our
extra conditions Eqs. (4.11–4.13)—i.e., the set of generalized valuations—may inherit
some, or all, of this logical structure. This could be expected to play an important role in
exploring the physical implications of these valuations. We shall return in a later paper
to discussing the structure of the space of all generalized valuations.
12With any object X in a topos, there is associated another object PX := ΩX , known as the ‘power
object’, which is the topos analogue of the power set of a set (the set of all subsets of the set). In
our case, BΣ is the subobject of the power object PΣ obtained by requiring the elements of BΣ(Aˆ)
to be Borel subsets of Σ(Aˆ) := σ(Aˆ) only—rather than arbitrary subsets—at each stage Aˆ. Thus the
‘coarse-graining’ presheaf is closely related to the power object PΣ.
5. Generalized Valuations as Global Sections of a Presheaf: We note in passing
that there is a bijection between morphisms from G to Ω, and global elements of the
‘exponential’ object ΩG which, roughly speaking, is the topos analogue of the set Y X of
all maps from X to Y in normal set theory. Thus a generalized valuation does turn out to
be a global section of a certain presheaf on O, but it is the presheaf ΩG, not the simple
dual presheaf D ◦W to which the Kochen-Specker ‘no-go’ theorem applies.
6. The Generalized Valuation of a Physical Quantity: Definition 4.1 gives gener-
alized truth-values to propositions of the form ‘A ∈ ∆’ but this leaves open the question
whether in the case of operators with purely discrete spectra, there is some corresponding
concept of a ‘generalized value’ for the physical quantity A.
Clearly this cannot generally be a single real number, unless all the propositions ‘A =
a’, a ∈ σ(Aˆ), (where Aˆ has a purely discrete spectrum) are evaluated as falseA except for
one, ‘A = a0’ say, which is evaluated as trueA; in this case one can say that the value of
A is a0. More generally, however, the quantity A has to be given some sort of ‘smeared’
value, corresponding to the collection of propositions ‘A = a’ that are not evaluated as
totally false. In fact, this suggests that, given a generalized valuation ν, we might try
defining the ‘value’ of the physical quantity A as V ν(A) := {〈a, ν(A = a)〉 | a ∈ σ(Aˆ)}, so
that we assign to A the collection of the eigenvalues of Aˆ ‘weighted’ with the generalized
valuations of the associated propositions.
With this preliminary definition, V ν(Aˆ) is a subset of σ(Aˆ) × Ω(Aˆ), and is hence a
relation between σ(Aˆ) and Ω(Aˆ). However, since each a ∈ σ(Aˆ) is associated with a
unique element ν(A = a) ∈ Ω(Aˆ), this relation defines a function from σ(Aˆ) to Ω(Aˆ),
and thus we arrive at the idea that V ν(A) should be such a function. However, this holds
at each stage of truth Aˆ and, it transpires, these fit together nicely to give a morphism
between the presheaves Σ and Ω in the category SetO
op
. More precisely, we have the
following theorem:
Theorem 4.3 To each generalized valuation ν in the sense of Definition 4.1 applied to
the category Od, there is associated a natural transformation V ν : Σ → Ω for which, at
each stage of truth Aˆ, the component V νA : Σ(Aˆ)→ Ω(Aˆ) is defined by
V νA (a) := ν(A = a). (4.23)
Proof
To see that this is a natural transformation we have to show that, if fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ, the
composite map Σ(Aˆ)
V ν
A−→ Ω(Aˆ) Ω(fOd )−→ Ω(Bˆ) is equal to Σ(Aˆ) Σ(fOd )−→ Σ(Bˆ) V
ν
B−→ Ω(Aˆ) (cf.,
the commutative diagram in Eq. (A.9)).
It is a straightforward task to prove this directly, but in fact this is not necessary since
the theorem can be derived at once from the earlier result in Theorem 4.2 that Nν is a
natural transformation from G (or BΣ) to Ω. The main step is to note the existence of a
natural transformation13 {}Σ : Σ→ BΣ whose components {}ΣA that map Σ(Aˆ) = σ(Aˆ)
to BΣ(Aˆ) = B(σ(Aˆ)) are
{}ΣA(a) := {a}. (4.24)
This is well-defined since {a} is a Borel subset of the (discrete) spectrum σ(Aˆ) of Aˆ; that
it satisfies the requirements for a natural transformation is obvious. Then, identifying the
coarse-graining presheaf G with BΣ, we see that V νA : Σ(Aˆ) → Ω(Aˆ) can be written as
V νA = (N
ν ◦ {}Σ)A for all stages Aˆ. Thus
V ν = Nν ◦ {}Σ (4.25)
which, as a composition of natural transformations, is itself a natural transformation.
Q.E.D.
In particular, it follows that each generalized valuation defines a subobject of the
spectral presheaf Σ (cf. the remarks in Subsection 4. above, or Eq. (A.21) for the
general definition of the subobject associated with a morphism into Ω). Note that the
exclusivity condition means that, in the map V νA : Σ(Aˆ)→ Ω(Aˆ), at most one element in
Σ(Aˆ) = σ(Aˆ) is assigned the value ‘totally true’ (trueA). Thus, the subobject ofΣ defined
by V ν has the property that the associated subset of each Σ(Aˆ) is either a singleton or it is
empty. In fact, it defines a partial section of the presheaf Σ, and hence a partial valuation
in the sense of Section 3 (i.e., a number-valued valuation with a limited domain)—which
we will also denote V ν—with
domV ν := {Aˆ | ∃a ∈ σ(Aˆ), s.t. V νA(a) = trueA} (4.26)
and with the value of any operator Aˆ in this domain being defined as the associated real
number a ∈ σ(Aˆ).
In Definition 3.3 we showed how to go from a partial valuation/section to a generalized
valuation; here we have shown how each generalized valuation leads back to a partial
valuation. We note in passing that the chain
partial valuation → generalized valuation→ partial valuation (4.27)
takes any given partial valuation back to itself. However we do not necessarily return to
the starting point if we begin the ‘chain’ with a generalized valuation; i.e.,
generalized valuation→ partial valuation → generalized valuation. (4.28)
We shall see an explicit example of this in Section 4.5.
4.3 The Generalized Valuation Associated with a Quantum State
Vector
We shall now show that any quantum state gives rise to an associated generalized valua-
tion.
13The notation reflects that fact that {}Σ : Σ → BΣ is a topos analogue of the map X → PX ,
x 7→ {x}, in standard set theory.
Let us start by considering the extent to which a vector ψ ∈ H can be regarded
as assigning a value to a physical quantity A represented by a self-adjoint operator Aˆ
(whose spectrum may not necessarily be purely discrete). In the standard interpretation
of quantum theory, one makes only the minimal claim that a physical quantity A possesses
a value a when the state ψ is an eigenstate of Aˆ with eigenvalue a; i.e., Aˆψ = aψ.
However, the ideas we have been developing in this paper suggest that even when ψ
is not an eigenvector of Aˆ, it may still be possible to give a partial truth-value to the
proposition ‘A = a’. Indeed, in the light of our earlier discussion, it is natural to reflect on
the possibility that some function f(Aˆ) of Aˆ may have ψ as an eigenvector, even though Aˆ
itself does not. Thus we are led to define, for each state ψ ∈ H, an associated generalized
valuation νψ on propositions ‘A = a’ as
νψ(A = a) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Bˆψ = f(a)ψ}. (4.29)
The condition Bˆψ = f(a)ψ is equivalent to Eˆ[B = f(a)]ψ = ψ, and this suggests an
obvious extension to include propositions of the form ‘A ∈ ∆’:
Definition 4.4 The generalized valuation νψ associated with a vector ψ ∈ H is
νψ(A ∈ ∆) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]ψ = ψ} (4.30)
where ∆ is a Borel subset of the spectrum σ(Aˆ) of Aˆ. If necessary, the right hand side of
Eq. (4.30) is to be understood in the sense of Eq. (4.2).
Note that if ψ is actually an eigenstate of Aˆ with eigenvalue a, then νψ(A ∈ ∆) = trueA,
if a ∈ ∆. This is a good illustration of the general rule-of-thumb that if a proposition is
evaluated as ‘totally true’, this is equivalent to saying that it is true in the normal sense;
i.e. in the sense of simple two-valued logic.
At this point we could check explicitly that the right hand side of Eq. (4.29) is a
sieve, and that νψ possesses the extra properties Eqs. (4.5–4.8) required for a generalized
valuation. However, we shall first give a few simple examples, and then press on to give
a substantial extension of the definition to include generalized valuations associated with
density matrices, and then prove all the needed results for that.
1. An Example with Spin-1/2: We take a two-dimensional spin system with ψ :=
1√
2
(
1
1
)
—which is an eigenstate of Sˆx—and consider the generalized evaluation of the
propositions ‘Sz =
1
2
’ and ‘Sz = −12 ’ (we choose units in which h¯ = 1).
The physical quantity Sz is represented by the matrix
1
2
(
1
0
0
−1
)
, and the only functions
of this for which ψ is an eigenvector are r(Sˆz)
2, r ∈ IR. Thus, if we use the category O,
the definition Eq. (4.29) of the generalized valuation νψ, says that both the propositions
‘Sz =
1
2
’ and ‘Sz = −12 ’ are only minimally true. If we use the category O∗ (so that
multiples of the unit operator are excluded as stages of truth) then
νψ(Sz =
1
2
) = ∅; νψ(Sz = −12) = ∅. (4.31)
Hence we see that, in this particular example, the physical quantity Sx—which, unequiv-
ocally, has the value 1/2 in the state ψ—is sufficiently ‘far’ from Sz that propositions
assigning a definite value to the latter cannot be evaluated as anything other than (i)
totally false, if O∗ is used as the category of contexts; or (ii) minimally true, if O is used.
On the other hand, the spectral projector corresponding to the proposition Sz ∈
{−1/2, 1/2} = σ(Sˆz) is the unit operator 1ˆ, and hence
νψ(Sz ∈ {−1/2, 1/2}) = trueSz . (4.32)
This result might be construed as asserting that the quantity Sz ‘exists’, even if it is
not possible to assign a non-trivial truth-value to a proposition that asserts it has any
specific value. As we shall see shortly, this unit proposition condition (defined earlier in
Eq. (3.28)) is always satisfied by a generalized valuation produced by a quantum state.
We note in passing that the result in Eq. (4.31) means that this particular type of
generalized valuation cannot be used by itself to construct a stochastic hidden variable
theory. More precisely, the example shows that, given a valuation νψ generated by a
normalised state ψ ∈ H, one cannot expect to find a measure µA on the space of sieves on
Aˆ, such that µA[ν
ψ(A ∈ ∆)] is equal to the quantum-mechanical value 〈ψ, Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]ψ〉
for the probability that a measurement of A will yield a result lying in ∆. Thus, in the
example, we have Prob(Sz = 1/2;ψ) = 1/2 and Prob(Sz = −1/2;ψ) = 1/2, whereas the
generalized truth-values of the propositions ‘Sz =
1
2
’ and ‘Sz = −12 ’ are both null (or
minimal).
2. An Example with Spin-1: We shall now consider an example where a non-trivial
generalized valuation is obtained. This involves a spin-1 system where the physical quan-
tities Sx and Sz are represented by the matrices
Sˆx =
1√
2

 0 1 01 0 1
0 1 0

 ; Sˆz = 1√
2

 1 0 00 0 0
0 0 −1

 (4.33)
respectively.
Let the quantum state ψ be (0, 1, 0)—which is an eigenstate of Sˆz with eigenvalue
0—and consider the propositions ‘Sx = 1’ and ‘Sx = −1’. Since ψ is not an eigenstate of
Sˆx, neither of these propositions is totally true at stage Sˆx. On the other hand,
Sˆ2x =
1
2

 1 0 10 2 0
1 0 1

 (4.34)
and we see that Sˆ2xψ = ψ. Furthermore, taking the square of Sˆ
2
x gives just a multiple of
itself, and taking the cube of Sˆx gives just a multiple of Sˆx; hence all functions of Sˆx are
of the form t1ˆ+kSˆx+rSˆ
2
x. Note that the real numbers t, k, r have to be such that k and r
are not both zero if we use the category O∗, since that excludes multiples of 1ˆ as possible
contexts/stages of truth.
It is easy to check that ψ is an eigenstate of t1ˆ + kSˆx + rSˆ
2
x if, and only if, k = 0;
hence, if st,rO : t1ˆ+rSˆ2x → Sˆx denotes the morphism in O that corresponds to the function
st,r : σ(Sˆx)→ IR defined by st,r(λ) := t+ rλ2, we see that
νψ(Sx = 1) = {st,rO : t1ˆ + rSˆ2x → Sˆx | t, r ∈ IR} (4.35)
and
νψ(Sx = −1) = {st,rO : t1ˆ + rSˆ2x → Sˆx | t, r ∈ IR}. (4.36)
The conclusion is that the propositions ‘Sx = 1’ and ‘Sx = −1’ are both assigned a non-
trivial partial truth-value: namely the sieve {st,rO : t1ˆ + rSˆ2x → Sˆx | t, r ∈ IR}; if O∗ is
used, then the value r = 0 is excluded.
On the other hand, we note that the proposition ‘Sx ∈ {−1, 1}’ is represented by the
projector Eˆ[Sx = −1] + Eˆ[Sx = +1], and also
ψ :=

 01
0

 = 1
2
√
2

 1√2
1

− 1
2
√
2

 1−√2
1

 (4.37)
where the column vectors on the right hand side are eigenvectors of Sˆx with eigenvalues
+1 and −1 respectively. It follows that Eˆ[Sx ∈ {−1, 1}]ψ = ψ, and hence
νψ(Sx ∈ {−1, 1}]) = trueSx (4.38)
whereas, as shown by Eqs. (4.35–4.36),
νψ(Sx = 1) ∨ νψ(Sx = −1) = {st,rO : t1ˆ + rSˆ2x → Sˆx | t, r ∈ IR} < trueSx . (4.39)
This failure of a strong disjunctive condition is typical of the generalized valuations pro-
duced by quantum states, and we shall return to this feature shortly. As emphasized in
the Introduction, it can be regarded as a fundamental consequence of the superposition
principle of quantum theory.
4.4 The Generalized Valuation Associated with a Density Ma-
trix
We shall now show that it is possible to associate a generalized valuation to each density
matrix state ρ in the quantum theory. To this end, we note that the previous definition
Eq. (4.30) for νψ can be re-expressed as
νψ(A ∈ ∆) = {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | 〈ψ, Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]ψ〉 = 〈ψ, ψ〉} (4.40)
or, in more physical terms,
νψ(A ∈ ∆) = {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Prob(B ∈ f(∆);ψ) = 1} (4.41)
where Prob(B ∈ f(∆);ψ) denotes the usual quantum mechanical probability that the
result of a measurement of B will lie in f(∆) ⊆ σ(Bˆ) ⊂ IR, given that the quantum state
is ψ.
This way of expressing νψ clarifies a little the physical meaning of the generalized
valuation—it is the set of coarse-grainings f(Aˆ) of Aˆ such that the probability that f(A)
lies in f(∆) is 1; something that is construed in the standard interpretation as equivalent
to saying that f(A) actually has a value in f(∆). It also suggests the following definition
for a generalized valuation associated with any density matrix:
Definition 4.5 The generalized valuation νρ associated with a density matrix ρ is
νρ(A ∈ ∆) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Prob(B ∈ f(∆); ρ) = 1}
= {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | tr(ρ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]) = 1}. (4.42)
If necessary, the right hand side of Eq. (4.42) is to be understood in the sense of Eq. (4.2).
This class of generalized valuation is clearly of considerable physical interest, and
therefore it is important to check that the necessary conditions are satisfied (of course,
this will include as a special case the generalized valuations νψ, ψ ∈ H.)
First we show that νρ(A ∈ ∆) is a sieve on Aˆ inO. Thus, suppose fO ∈ νρ(A ∈ ∆), and
let hO : Cˆ → Bˆ. Then, in the lattice P of projection operators, Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)] ≤ Eˆ[C ∈
h(f(∆))]; and hence tr(ρ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]) ≤ tr(ρEˆ[C ∈ h(f(∆))]. In particular, since
fO ∈ νρ(A ∈ ∆), we have tr(ρ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]) = 1, and hence tr(ρEˆ[C ∈ h(f(∆))]) = 1
(since tr(ρPˆ ) ≤ 1 for all projection operators Pˆ ). Thus hO ∈ νρ(A ∈ ∆), which proves
that νρ(A ∈ ∆) is a sieve on Aˆ.
1. The Functional Composition Rule: Next we must show that the functional
composition rule is satisfied. If kO : Cˆ → Aˆ, then
k∗O(ν
ρ(A ∈ ∆)) := {jO : Dˆ → Cˆ | kO ◦ jO ∈ νρ(A ∈ ∆)}
= {jO : Dˆ → Cˆ | tr(ρ Eˆ[D ∈ j(k(∆))]) = 1} (4.43)
whereas
νρ(k(A) ∈ k(∆)) := {hO : Dˆ → k(Aˆ) | tr(ρ Eˆ[D ∈ h(k(∆))]) = 1}. (4.44)
Thus k∗O(ν
ρ(A ∈ ∆)) = νρ(k(A) ∈ k(∆)), as required.
We shall now consider the extent to which the object νρ defined in Eq. (4.42) satisfies
the remaining conditions Eqs. (4.6–4.8) in the formal definition of a generalized valuation.
2. The Null Proposition Condition: To check this, we note that νρ(A ∈ ∅) := {fO :
Bˆ → Aˆ | tr(ρ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∅)]) = 1}. But this is the empty set since Eˆ[B ∈ f(∅)] = 0ˆ. Hence
the null proposition condition is satisfied.
3. The Monotonicity Condition: Suppose fO ∈ νρ(A ∈ ∆1) where
νρ(A ∈ ∆1) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | tr(ρ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆1)]) = 1}. (4.45)
If ∆1 ⊆ ∆2, then f(∆1) ⊆ f(∆2); and in the lattice of projection operators we then have
Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆1)]) ≤ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆2)]). (4.46)
But then tr(ρ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆1)]) = 1 implies that tr(ρ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆2)]) = 1 (since tr(ρPˆ ) ≤ 1
for all projection operators Pˆ ). Thus fO also belongs to ν(A ∈ ∆2), which means that
νρ(A ∈ ∆1) ⊆ νρ(A ∈ ∆2). However, in the Heyting algebra of sieves on Aˆ, the partial
ordering operations is just subset inclusion; hence we have shown that
∆1 ⊆ ∆2 implies νρ(A ∈ ∆1) ≤ νρ(A ∈ ∆2), (4.47)
as required.
3.1 No Strong Disjunctive Condition: From the monotonicity result in Eq. (4.47)
one can immediately derive the weak disjunctive condition
νρ(A ∈ ∆1) ∪ νρ(A ∈ ∆2) ≤ νρ(A ∈ ∆1 ∪∆2). (4.48)
However, in Section 1.3 we remarked, in rather general terms, that the existence of the
quantum superposition principle suggests that the reverse inequality may not hold in Eq.
(4.48). To see this explicitly, consider the special case when ρ comes from a state vector
ψ, and let ∆1 := {a1}, ∆2 := {a2} with a1 6= a2—i.e., we are considering the propositions
‘A = a1’ and ‘A = a2’. Then
νψ(A ∈ {a1}) ∪ νψ(A ∈ {a2}) = {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Bˆψ = f(a1)ψ or Bˆψ = f(a2)ψ} (4.49)
whereas
νψ(A ∈ {a1, a2}) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Eˆ[B ∈ f({a1, a2})]ψ = ψ}. (4.50)
Now suppose f : σ(Aˆ)→ IR is such that f(a1) 6= f(a2). Then satisfaction of the condition
in Eq. (4.50) requires only that ψ lies in the direct sum of the eigenspaces of the operator
Bˆ := f(Aˆ) that are associated with the eigenvalues f(a1) and f(a2); in particular, if ψ is
a non-trivial linear superposition of these eigenstates of Bˆ, then fO : Bˆ → Aˆ will belong
to the sieve νψ(A ∈ {a1, a2}), but it will not belong to νψ(A ∈ {a1}) ∪ νψ(A ∈ {a2}).
Thus, there is a strict inequality in Eq. (4.48); an explicit example is Eqs.(4.38–4.39)
in the spin-1 model discussed above, with f chosen to be the identity map on Sˆx. This
should be contrasted with the generalized valuation νV that satisfies the strong disjunctive
condition Eq. (3.22).
3.2 No Strong Conjunctive Condition: We can also confirm the absence of any
strong conjunctive condition. Indeed, using the same pair of propositions as above, we
have ‘A ∈ {a1} ∧ A ∈ {a2}’ = ‘A ∈ {a1} ∩ {a2}’ = ‘A ∈ ∅’; and hence
νρ(A ∈ {a1} ∧A ∈ {a2}) = ∅ = 0A. (4.51)
On the other hand
νρ(A ∈ {a1}) ∩ νρ(A ∈ {a2}) = {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | tr(ρ Eˆ[B ∈ f({a1})]) = 1 and
tr(ρ Eˆ[B ∈ f({a2})]) = 1}. (4.52)
Then, if we chose f such that f(a1) = f(a2) it is perfectly possible for the right hand side
of Eq. (4.52) to be non-trivial. Thus, in general, there is no strong conjunctive condition.
4. The Exclusivity Condition: Finally, we must check the exclusivity condition.
Thus suppose ∆1 ∩ ∆2 = ∅ and νρ(A ∈ ∆1) = trueA; then, in particular, tr(ρ Eˆ[A ∈
∆1]) = 1. Now define the real number k := tr(ρ Eˆ[A ∈ ∆2]); this satisfies 0 ≤ k ≤ 1.
Then, since ∆1 ∩∆2 = ∅, the projectors Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1] and Eˆ[A ∈ ∆2] are orthogonal, and
therefore Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1 ∪∆2] = Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1] + Eˆ[A ∈ ∆2]. Thus tr(ρ Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1 ∪∆2]) = 1+ k.
However, since tr(ρPˆ ) ≤ 1 for all projection operators Pˆ , and k ≥ 0, we deduce that
k = 0, i.e., tr(ρ Eˆ[A ∈ ∆2]) = 0. This means that νρ(A ∈ ∆2) < trueA; which proves
exclusivity.
5. The Unit Proposition Condition: We recall that, in the case of the generalized
valuation νV , the unit proposition A ∈ σ(Aˆ) is not necessarily given the truth-value trueA
but instead satisfies the equation Eq. (3.30).
The situation for νρ is as follows. We have
νρ(A ∈ σ(Aˆ)) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | tr(ρ Eˆ[B ∈ f(σ(Aˆ))]) = 1}. (4.53)
But, according to the definition in Eq. (4.2), Eˆ[B ∈ f(σ(Aˆ))] = 1ˆ; and thus, for these
types of generalized valuation, we do have
νρ(A ∈ σ(Aˆ)) = trueA (4.54)
or, equivalently,
νρA(1ˆ) = trueA (4.55)
for all contexts Aˆ.
The Negation Operation: We have not made any use so far of the negation operation
in the Heyting algebra of sieves, which is defined in general in Eq. (A.18). In the case of
the sieve νρ(A ∈ ∆), this gives
¬νρ(A ∈ ∆) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | ∀gO : Cˆ → Bˆ, fO ◦ gO 6∈ νρ(A ∈ ∆)}
= {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | ∀gO : Cˆ → Bˆ, tr(ρEˆ[g(f(A)) ∈ g(f(∆))]) < 1}. (4.56)
This is one point at which there is a real difference between using O andO∗ as the category
of contexts. In the former case, we are allowed the unit operator 1ˆ as an allowed stage
of truth, and then the choice of g as the constant map c1,O : 1ˆ → Bˆ gives the spectral
projector Eˆ[g(f(A) ∈ g(f(∆)) = Eˆ[1 ∈ {1}] = 1ˆ, for which tr(ρEˆ) = 1. Thus the right
hand side of Eq. (4.56) would always be the empty set, since this particular g would exist
and violate the strict inequality.14
14In fact, this is true of presheaves defined over any category C that has an initial object;i.e., an object
I such that there is a morphism from I to every object in the category.
Thus, the negation operation is essentially trivial if the category O is used, and this
might suggest employing O∗ instead. On the other hand, if we do keep the unit operator
as a possible stage of truth, then the definition of νρ shows that the set of operators
appearing as the domains of morphisms in the sieve νρ(A ∈ ∆) form an abelian algebra
of operators. This is an attractive feature, and might suggest that using O has certain
advantages too. Note that the spin-1 example discussed earlier shows this effect very
clearly: the set of operators {t1ˆ + rSˆ2x | t, r ∈ IR} that appear in the right hand sides of
Eq. (4.35) and Eq. (4.36) are both abelian subalgebras, but cease to be so if the value
r = 0 is excluded—as would be the case if O∗ is used as the category of contexts.
A Generalization of the Valuations νρ: Finally, we note in passing that there exists
a one-parameter family of extensions of our valuations νρ. Namely, we define
νr,ρ(A ∈ ∆) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Prob(B ∈ f(∆); ρ) ≥ r} (4.57)
= {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | tr(ρ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]) ≥ r}
where r is a real parameter satisfying 0 < r ≤ 1. It is straightforward to show that for
all real numbers r in this range, νr,ρ satisfies all our defining conditions for a generalized
valuation, with the exception of exclusivity. Exclusivity is also satisfied if the parameter r
lies in the range 1
2
≤ r ≤ 1. This is an intriguing class of generalized valuation, because it
seems to promise a topos perspective on the probabilistic statements of quantum theory.
4.5 From Generalized Valuation to Partial Valuation, and Back
Again
As mentioned in the context of Theorem 4.3: in the case of operators with a purely discrete
spectrum, each generalized valuation ν on propositions leads to the valuation V ν : Σ→ Ω
on physical quantities, as defined in Eq. (4.23). In particular, for the generalized valuation
νρ associated with a density matrix ρ, we have
V ν
ρ
A (a) = {fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ | tr(ρEˆ[B = f(a)]) = 1}. (4.58)
Now consider the generalized valuation νψ associated with a quantum state ψ (as in
Eq. (4.30)) in a situation where all the operators concerned have a discrete spectrum only.
The corresponding generalized valuation Eq. (4.58) on physical quantities gives rise to a
partial valuation, which we shall denote V ψ, whose domain is defined as in Eq. (4.26);
thus
domV ψ = {Bˆ | Bˆψ = bψ for some b} (4.59)
and, of course, if Bˆ belongs to the domain of V ψ, then V ψ(Bˆ) := b.
We can now apply Definition 3.4 to the partial valuation V ψ to get an associated
generalized valuation νV
ψ
with
νV
ψ
(A ∈ ∆) := {fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ | ∃b, Bˆψ = bψ and b ∈ f(∆)}, (4.60)
which should be contrasted with the original definition of νψ:
νψ(A ∈ ∆) := {fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ | Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]ψ = ψ}. (4.61)
We point we wish to emphasize is that the generalized valuations in Eq. (4.60) and
Eq. (4.61) assign the same truth-values to propositions of the type ‘A = a’, but they differ
in the way they treat more general propositions ‘A ∈ ∆’.
Thus, the definition of νV
ψ
in Eq. (4.60) shows that fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ belongs to the
sieve νV ψ(A ∈ ∆) if, and only if, (i) ψ is an eigenvector of Bˆ = f(Aˆ); and (ii) the
corresponding eigenvalue b belongs to f(∆)—in other words, the coarse-grained operator
f(Aˆ) has a value in the state ψ, and this value lies in f(∆). On the other hand, for
fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ to belong to the sieve νψ(A ∈ ∆) requires only that ψ is some linear
combination of such eigenstates of f(Aˆ). In particular, this proves our earlier remark that
the chain in Eq. (4.28) is not the identity transformation on generalized valuations.
4.6 The Generalized Valuation Produced by a Projection Op-
erator
There is apparently another way of constructing generalized valuations using the mathe-
matical ingredients of quantum theory. To see this, we note that the defining condition
Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]ψ = ψ for νψ(A ∈ ∆) (see equation Eq. (4.30)) can be written as
Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]|ψ〉〈ψ| = |ψ〉〈ψ|Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)] = |ψ〉〈ψ| (4.62)
where |ψ〉〈ψ| denotes the projector onto the vector ψ. The expression Eq. (4.62) suggests
an immediate generalization to
Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)] Pˆ = Pˆ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)] = Pˆ (4.63)
where Pˆ is now an arbitrary projection operator. In turn, this condition is equivalent to
the relation Pˆ ≤ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)] in the lattice of projection operators. Hence we are led to
the following definition:
Definition 4.6 The generalized valuation νP associated with a projection operator Pˆ is
νP (A ∈ ∆) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Pˆ ≤ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]}. (4.64)
It is relatively straightforward to show that the necessary conditions for a generalized
valuation are satisfied; and, for reasons of space, we shall not go into the details here. In
fact, if Pˆ is a finite projector (i.e., its range is a finite-dimensional subspace of the Hilbert
space H) then νP is just a special case of the density-matrix construction given above:
Theorem 4.4 If Pˆ is a projector such that dim Pˆ = n < ∞, then, for all propositions
‘A ∈ ∆’,
νP (A ∈ ∆) = νρP (A ∈ ∆) (4.65)
where ρP := 1
n
Pˆ is the density matrix given by the projection operator Pˆ .
Proof
If Pˆ ≤ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)] we have Pˆ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)] = Pˆ , and hence tr(ρP Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]) =
tr 1
n
Pˆ = 1. Thus νP (A ∈ ∆) ⊆ νρP (A ∈ ∆).
Conversely, suppose Bˆ is such that tr(ρP Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]) = 1. Then tr 1
n
Pˆ = 1 =
tr ( 1
n
Pˆ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]), which implies at once that Pˆ ≤ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]. Therefore νρP (A ∈
∆) ⊆ νP (A ∈ ∆). Hence νρP (A ∈ ∆) = νP (A ∈ ∆). Q.E.D.
Thus nothing new is gained by introducing the valuations νP on a finite-dimensional
Hilbert space. However, if H has an infinite dimension, then νP does give a new type of
valuation provided that the projection operator Pˆ has an infinite range.
5 Using the Set of Boolean Sub-Algebras as the Space
of Contexts
5.1 Preliminary Definitions
We remarked earlier on the existence of a number of isomorphic pairs of objects in the
category O. This occurs whenever operators Aˆ and Bˆ are related by Bˆ = f(Aˆ) and
Aˆ = g(Bˆ) for some functions f : σ(Aˆ)→ IR and g : σ(Bˆ)→ IR.
From a physical perspective, if we know the value of one member of such a pair of
physical quantities, then we automatically know the value of the other, and vice versa.
In this sense, the quantities are ‘physically equivalent’ and, in some circumstances, it is
natural therefore to concentrate on the equivalence classes, rather than on the individual
quantities themselves. In particular—since the spectral Boolean algebras WA and WB of
such pairs of operators are isomorphic—a unique Boolean algebra can be associated with
each equivalence class of physical quantities.
Viewed mathematically, this suggests moving towards a formalism in which the space
of contexts, or stages of truth, is the categoryW of all Boolean subalgebras of the projec-
tion lattice, rather than the category O of self-adjoint operators. Actually, we could have
started ab initio with W as the space of contexts, but we elected to use O instead since
the physical motivation for some of the mathematical constructions is more transparent
in this case; in particular, this is true of the coarse-graining operation. However, as we
shall see in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, the use of W also suggests generalizations of the idea
of coarse-graining which do not arise in such a natural way if the category O is used.
Another significant reason for studying the use of W is that most of the discussion ex-
tends at once to the general quantum logic situation in which all that is said of the basic
mathematical structure of a quantum theory is that the propositions are represented by
elements in an orthomodular, orthocomplemented lattice; however, we do not take up this
generalization here.
We start by constructing several important presheaf objects in the topos SetW
op
. The
dual presheaf D :Wop → Set on W was introduced in Definition 2.3, with D(W ) defined
to be the dual of the Boolean algebra W ; i.e., the set of homomorphisms from W to the
Boolean algebra {0, 1}. In our case, we are interested in a generalization of this situation
in which the ‘homomorphisms’ from W takes their values in the Heyting algebra Ω(W )
of sieves on W in the category W rather than in {0, 1}. Furthermore, we must satisfy
the algebraic conditions that specify a generalized valuation. To formalize these ideas we
start with the following definition.
Definition 5.1 A valuation of a Boolean algebra B in a Heyting algebra H is a map
φ : B → H such that the following conditions are satisfied:
Null proposition condition : φ(0B) = 0H (5.1)
Monotonicity : α ≤ β implies φ(α) ≤ φ(β) (5.2)
Exclusivity : If α ∧ β = 0B and φ(α) = 1H , then φ(β) < 1. (5.3)
The set of all valuations from B to H will be denoted Val(B,H).
These have been chosen to be the analogues of the conditions that we have used a number
of times already; and, as before, we may also want to add the ‘Unit condition’:
Unit proposition condition: φ(1B) = 1H (5.4)
In the case when B is a Boolean subalgebra W ∈ W, and H is Ω(W ), the elements of
Val(W,Ω(W )) will be referred to as ‘local valuations ’.
We can now define a natural generalization of the dual presheafD onW (see Definition
2.3) in which the standard dual of a Boolean algebra is replaced with an Ω(W )-valued
valuation.
Definition 5.2 The valuation presheaf of W is the contravariant functor V : W → Set
defined as follows:
1. On objects in W: V(W ) := Val(W,Ω(W )), the set of local valuations on W .
2. On morphisms in W: If iW2W1 : W2 → W1 (i.e., W2 ⊆ W1), then V(iW2W1) :
Val(W1,Ω(W1))→ Val(W2,Ω(W2)) is defined by
[V(iW2W1)(φ)](αˆ) := i
∗
W2W1
(φ(iW2W1(αˆ))) (5.5)
where φ ∈ Val(W1,Ω(W1)) and αˆ ∈ W2, and where, in the poset category W, we
have i∗W2W1(S) =↓W2 ∩ S for all S ∈ Ω(W1) (cf., Eq. (A.13)).
It is interesting consider global elements of V for two reasons: (i) in order to compare
with the dual presheaf D, for which—as we saw in Section 2.3—global elements are
ruled out by the Kochen-Specker theorem; and (ii) in order to make a contrast with the
definition of a generalized valuation in Section 4.
A global element γ of the valuation presheaf corresponds to a family of local valuations
γW ∈ Val(W,Ω(W )), W ∈ W, such that, if W2 ⊆W1 then, for all αˆ ∈W2,
γW2(αˆ) = [V(iW2W1)(γW1)](αˆ) = i
∗
W2W1
{γW1(iW2W1(αˆ))}. (5.6)
In order to see the potential application for such global elements, it is instructive to
study these equations in the special case where W1 = WA and W2 = Wh(A) for some
function h : σ(Aˆ)→ IR. Thus, suppose that αˆ is the projection operator Eˆ[h(A) ∈ Λ] for
some Borel subset Λ ⊆ σ(h(Aˆ)). Then
iWh(A)WA(Eˆ[h(A) ∈ Λ]) = Eˆ[A ∈ h−1(Λ)] (5.7)
and hence the matching condition in Eq. (5.6) reads
γWh(A)(Eˆ[h(A) ∈ Λ]) = i∗Wh(A)WA{γWA(Eˆ[A ∈ h−1(Λ)])}. (5.8)
In particular,
γWh(A)(Eˆ[h(A) ∈ h(∆)]) = i∗Wh(A)WA{γWA(Eˆ[A ∈ h−1(h(∆))])}. (5.9)
The corresponding matching equation in Section 4 for the case of a generalized valu-
ation on O was (Eq. (4.5))
ν(h(A) ∈ h(∆)) = h∗O{ν(A ∈ ∆)} (5.10)
or, in explicit contextual form,
νh(A)(Eˆ[h(A) ∈ h(∆)]) = h∗O{νA(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆])}. (5.11)
Here it is important to contrast equations Eq. (5.9) and Eq. (5.11). In Eq. (5.11) the
truth-value of the proposition ‘h(A) ∈ h(∆)’ in the context h(Aˆ) is equated with the
pull-back of the truth value of the finer proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ at stage Aˆ; whereas in Eq.
(5.9) it is equated with the pull-back of the valuation of the proposition ‘A ∈ h−1(h(∆))’.
However, in the lattice of projectors, the projectors Eˆ[A ∈ h−1(h(∆))] and Eˆ[h(A) ∈
h(∆)] are equal: so one is not pulling back a valuation of a finer proposition. Indeed, this
equality is reflected in Eq. (5.6) which guarantees the consistency of (i) the sieve valuation
of a given projector αˆ ∈W2, in the context W2, with (ii) the sieve valuation of αˆ if W2 is
embedded in the larger Boolean algebraW1 and the valuation is then taken in the context
of W1.
To sum up: the equality of Eˆ[A ∈ h−1(h(∆))] and Eˆ[h(A) ∈ h(∆)] means that if we
were to define a generalized valuation to be a global section of the valuation presheaf V,
this would not be equivalent to our earlier definition 4.1, or 4.2, using the category O.
Global sections of V could possibly be used to develop another topos semantics for
quantum theory—certainly, we would not wish to claim that the approach adopted in the
present paper is necessarily the only one. The first step would be to show that global
sections of V actually exist; preferably by finding concrete examples in analogy to, for
example, the quantum-state induced general valuations νρ discussed earlier.
We may return in a later paper to the possible use of V in the semantics of quantum
theory. But for the remainder of this section we shall concentrate on showing how the
analogue of the coarse-graining operation—which played a central role in our definition of
a generalized valuation on O—can be introduced into the mathematical framework based
on W.
5.2 The Motivation for the Coarse-Graining Axioms
Motivated by what we did using the category O, we wish to define a coarse-graining
operation from W1 to W2 where W1 and W2 are Boolean subalgebras of projectors with
W2 ⊆W1. This is intended to play an analogous role to that of the coarse-graining functor
G : Oop → Set, where the map G(fO) : WA → WB, with Bˆ = f(Aˆ), was defined in Eq.
(4.16) to map the projector Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] to Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)].
The procedure we shall follow is to extract certain key properties of the coarse-graining
process in O in this Section, and then in Section 5.3 use these as the basis for an axiom-
atization of an analogous procedure for W.
1. Coarse Graining: The first step is to express more precisely the coarse-graining
property itself. We start by recalling that, in the lattice of projection operators,
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)]. (5.12)
However, if we wish to think of the operators on the left and right hand sides of Eq.
(5.12) as elements of the Boolean subalgebras WA and Wf(A) respectively, then it pays to
be pedantic by rewriting Eq. (5.12) as
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ iWf(A)WA(Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)]) (5.13)
where iWf(A)WA : Wf(A) → WA is the embedding of the Boolean algebra Wf(A) in WA. In
this sense, the precise statement of the coarse-graining property is
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ iWf(A)WA(G(fO)(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆])) (5.14)
where the partial ordering ‘≤’ takes place in the Boolean algebra WA. The analogue of
this expression will play a key role in what follows.
2. The Retraction Property: Considered as an element ofWA, the spectral projector
Eˆ[f(A) ∈ J ] is E[A ∈ f−1(J)]; more precisely,
iWf(A)WA(Eˆ[f(A) ∈ J ]) = Eˆ[A ∈ f−1(J))], (5.15)
and hence
G(fO) ◦ iWf(A)WA(Eˆ[f(A) ∈ J ]) = Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(f−1(J))]. (5.16)
However, using the definition in Eq. (4.2), it is easy to show that the right hand side
of Eq. (5.16) is equal to Eˆ[f(A) ∈ J ]. Hence Eq. (5.16) becomes, for all Borel subsets
J ⊆ σ(f(Aˆ))),
G(fO) ◦ iWf(A)WA(Eˆ[f(A) ∈ J ]) = Eˆ[f(A) ∈ J ] (5.17)
which can be rewritten succinctly as
G(fO) ◦ iWf(A)WA = idWf(A). (5.18)
This is expressed by saying that G(fO) : WA → Wf(A) is a retraction15 map from WA
onto its embedded subalgebra Wf(A).
15In general, a map r : Y → X is a retraction of a subset embedding i : X ⊆ Y if r(x) = x for all
x ∈ X ⊆ Y ; X is then said to be a retract of Y . Formally, we can write this as r ◦ i = idX .
3. Composition Conditions: Since G is a contravariant functor from O to Set, it
follows that if hO : Cˆ → Bˆ and fO : Bˆ → Aˆ, then fO ◦ hO : Cˆ → Aˆ, and
G(fO ◦ hO) = G(hO) ◦G(fO). (5.19)
These can be thought of as the ‘composition conditions’ that must be satisfied by a
coarse-graining operation.
4. Monotonicity: If ∆1 ⊆ ∆2, then f(∆1) ⊆ f(∆2), and hence Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆1)] ≤
Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆2)]. From this we deduce the monotonicity condition that is satisfied by
the coarse-graining presheaf G. Namely, if ∆1 ⊆ ∆2, then
G(fO)(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1]) ≤ G(fO)(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆2]) (5.20)
Note that the partial-ordering operation ‘≤’ in Eq. (5.20) is taken in the Boolean algebra
Wf(A).
5.3 The Definition of Coarse-Graining on W
1. A Coarse-Graining Presheaf on W: Motivated by the above we can now give
our formal definition of a ‘coarse-graining’ operation on the category W.
Definition 5.3 A coarse-graining onW is an operation that associates to each pairW2 ⊆
W1, a ‘coarse-graining’ map θW1W2 :W1 →W2 with the following properties:
1. Coarse-graining: For all αˆ ∈W1,
αˆ ≤ iW2W1(θW1W2(αˆ)). (5.21)
If W2 = W1, then θW1W1 = idW1.
2. Monotonicity: If αˆ, βˆ ∈W1 are such that α ≤ β, then
θW1W2(αˆ) ≤ θW1W2(βˆ) (5.22)
3. Retraction: For all αˆ ∈W2,
θW1W2(iW2W1(αˆ)) = αˆ. (5.23)
Thus θW1W2 is a retraction of W2 onto W1; i.e., θW1W2 ◦ iW2W1 = idW2.
4. Composition conditions: If W3 ⊆W2 ⊆W1 then
θW2W3 ◦ θW1W2 = θW1W3. (5.24)
From a topos perspective, the composition conditions show that θ defines a presheaf
Θ : Wop → Set that is defined (i) on objects as Θ(W ) := W ; and (ii) on a morphism
iW2W1 : W2 → W1 as Θ(iW2W1) := θW1W2 . Conversely, we could define a ‘coarse-graining
presheaf onW’ to be a presheaf on W that satisfies the remaining conditions, viz. coarse-
graining, monotonicity, and retraction.
2. The Canonical Coarse-Graining Presheaf: It is important to show that there
exists at least one coarse-graining presheaf. In the analogous case of contextualizing
over O, there was a ‘canonical’ coarse-graining operation that came from considering the
implications of writing one operator Bˆ as a function f(Aˆ) of another. The key to finding
the analogue of this construction for the category W is contained in Theorem 4.1. This
result leads naturally to the following definition:
Definition 5.4 The canonical coarse-graining of W associates to each pair W2 ⊆ W1,
the coarse-graining map φW1W2 : W1 →W2 defined by
φW1W2(αˆ) := inf{βˆ ∈W2 | αˆ ≤ iW2W1(βˆ)} (5.25)
for all αˆ ∈W1.
We shall leave as a straightforward exercise the task of showing that the entity thus
defined really does satisfy all the requirements for a coarse-graining operation: coarse-
graining, monotonicity, retraction, and the composition condition.
3. Generalized Valuations Associated with a Coarse-Graining Presheaf: We
shall now show that for any given coarse-graining presheaf, there is an associated definition
of a generalized valuation that is constructed as a matching family of local valuations:
Definition 5.5 A generalized valuation on W associated with a coarse-graining presheaf
Θ is a family of local valuations φW : W → Ω(W ), W ∈ W, such that if W2 ⊆ W1 then,
for all αˆ ∈W1,
φW2(θW1W2(αˆ)) = i
∗
W2W1
(φW1(αˆ)). (5.26)
From a physical perspective, the interpretation of a generalized valuation on W is
closely analogous to that of generalized valuation onO as given by the discussion following
Definition 4.1. Specifically: although a particular projector αˆ ∈ W1 may not be assigned
the value ‘totally true’ at a stage of truth W1, it does have a partial truth-value that is
given by the set of coarser Boolean algebras W2 that belong to the sieve φW1(αˆ), where,
on account of Eq. (5.26), each corresponding coarse-grained projector θW1W2(αˆ) is given
the value ‘totally true’ at the corresponding stage of truth W2. (This should be compared
with the discussion following Eq. (A.12), and after Eq. (3.15).)
4. The Generalized Valuation Produced by a Density Matrix: There is no dif-
ficulty in finding examples of generalized valuations associated with any coarse-graining
presheaf. In particular, each density-matrix state ρ produces one according to the follow-
ing definition.
Definition 5.6 The generalized valuation νρ on W associated with a coarse-graining
presheaf Θ and a density matrix ρ, is defined at each stage W by
νρW (αˆ) := {W ′ ⊆ W | tr(ρ θWW ′(αˆ)) = 1} (5.27)
for all αˆ ∈W .
To show that this is indeed a generalized valuation it is necessary to show that (i)
each νρW : W → Ω(W ) is a local valuation; and (ii) the maps νρW fit together in the way
indicated by the intertwining condition in Eq. (5.26). The proofs are contained in the
following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 The quantity νρ defined in Eq. (5.27) satisfies all the conditions for a
generalized valuation on W.
Proof
A. For each stage W ∈ W, νρW is a local valuation:
1. νρW (αˆ) is a sieve: The first step is to show that ν
ρ
W (αˆ) is a sieve on W in W. Thus
suppose that W ′ ∈ νρW (αˆ) and consider any subalgebra W ′′ ⊆ W ′. The composition
condition Eq. (5.24) applied to the chain W ′′ ⊆W ′ ⊆W gives
θWW ′′(αˆ) = θW ′W ′′(θWW ′(αˆ)) (5.28)
for all αˆ ∈ W . Then applying the coarse-graining condition Eq. (5.21) to θWW ′(αˆ), and
using Eq. (5.28), we get
θWW ′(αˆ) ≤ iW ′′W ′ (θW ′W ′′(θWW ′(αˆ))) = iW ′′W ′(θWW ′′(αˆ)). (5.29)
Hence, in the Boolean algebra W ′, we have θWW ′(αˆ) ≤ θWW ′′(αˆ). Thus, in particular,
tr(ρ θWW ′(αˆ)) = 1 implies tr(ρ θWW ′′(αˆ)) = 1; and hence ν
ρ
W (αˆ) is a sieve on W in W.
2. The null proposition condition: The equations Eq. (5.23) and iW ′W (0W ′) = 0W ,
imply θWW ′(0ˆ) = 0ˆ, from which the null proposition condition follows at once. It is also
trivial to check that νρ satisfies the unit proposition condition νρW (1ˆ) = trueW .
3. The monotonicity condition: To show monotonicity, suppose that αˆ, βˆ ∈ W
satisfy αˆ ≤ βˆ, and that W ′ ∈ νρW (αˆ), so that tr(ρ θWW ′(αˆ)) = 1. Then the monotonicity
condition Eq. (5.22) obeyed by the coarse-graining operation implies that θWW ′(αˆ) ≤
θWW ′(βˆ), and hence that tr(ρ θWW ′(αˆ)) ≤ tr(ρ θWW ′(βˆ)). However, tr(ρPˆ ) ≤ 1 for all
projection operators Pˆ , and hence tr(ρ θWW ′(αˆ)) = 1 implies tr(ρ θWW ′(βˆ)) = 1, which
means that W ′ ∈ νρW (β); hence the monotonicity condition is satisfied.
4. The exclusivity condition: To show exclusivity, suppose that αˆ, βˆ ∈ W satisfy
αˆ ∧ βˆ = 0, and that νρW (αˆ) := 1W . The latter implies that W ∈ νρW (αˆ), and hence, since
θWW = idW , we have tr(ρ αˆ) = 1. However, αˆ ∧ βˆ = 0 implies that βˆ ≤ ¬αˆ and, since
¬αˆ = 1ˆ− αˆ, we get
0 ≤ tr(ρβˆ) ≤ tr(ρ(1ˆ− αˆ)) = 0. (5.30)
Thus tr(ρβˆ) = 0, and hence W 6∈ νρW (βˆ). Therefore, νρW (βˆ) < 1W , which proves exclusiv-
ity.
B. For each stage W ∈ W, νρ satisfies the intertwining condition Eq. (5.26):
To see that Eq. (5.26) is satisfied, let W2,W1 ∈ W be such that W2 ⊆ W1. Then, for all
αˆ ∈W1,
νρW2(θW1W2(αˆ)) := {W ′ ⊆W2 | tr(ρ θW2W ′(θW1W2(αˆ))) = 1}
= {W ′ ⊆W2 | tr(ρ θW1W ′(αˆ)) = 1} (5.31)
where the last line follows from the composition conditions Eq. (5.24). On the other
hand,
{W ′ ⊆W2 | tr(ρ θW1W ′(αˆ)) = 1} = ↓W2 ∩ {W ′ ⊆W1 | tr(ρ θW1W ′(αˆ)) = 1}
= i∗W2W1(ν
ρ
W1
(αˆ)), (5.32)
so that νW2(θW1W2(αˆ)) = i
∗
W2W1
(νW1(αˆ)), as required. Q.E.D.
5. The Topos-Theoretic Perspective: From a topos-theoretic perspective we note
that each generalized valuation ν on W defines a natural transformation Nν between the
coarse-graining presheaf Θ and the subobject classifier Ω, in which, at each stage of truth
W , NνW : Θ(W )→ Ω(W ) is defined by NνW (αˆ) := νW (αˆ). It is a straightforward exercise
in diagram chasing to show that Nν really is a natural transformation.
Thus to each generalized valuation ν onW there corresponds a morphism in the topos
SetW
op
between the coarse-graining presheafΘ and the sub-object classifier. In particular,
therefore, each generalized valuation on W corresponds to a subobject of Θ. The overall
implications of this are the same as for the analogous result in the case of generalized
valuations defined on O.
6 Conclusion
The Kochen-Specker theorem shows the non-existence of global valuations on the self-
adjoint operators in a quantum theory if the dimension of the underlying Hilbert space
H is greater than two. We have shown that this theorem is equivalent to the statement
that a certain presheaf on the category of bounded self-adjoint operators has no global
sections. Then, motivated by the underlying topos structure, we introduced a new type
of valuation which is globally defined, but whose truth values (i) are contextual; and (ii)
lie in a larger Heyting algebra than the minimal {0, 1} Boolean algebra of standard logic.
Thus our construction shows clearly how contextual features enter into a ‘neo-realist’
interpretation of quantum theory. It also shows that the use of multi-valued logic is
perfectly feasible. In particular, there is no ambiguity or uncertainty about what the
logical connectives are: the Heyting algebra of the sieves at any particular stage of truth,
or context, is precisely fixed by the structure of the base category—in our case O or
W—on which the relevant presheaves are defined.
As we generalize at the end of the Introduction, the main aim of the present paper
is to provide the main mathematical tools and some of the general ideas involved in the
application of topos ideas in quantum theory. Much remains to be done to develop both
the mathematical and the conceptual implications of these ideas; the latter in particular
are discussed in a forthcoming paper [16].
At the mathematical level, the work reported in this paper suggests a number of topics
for further research. Of particular importance is the study of the space of all generalized
valuations which—as mentioned in Section 4.2—might carry an intuitionistic logical struc-
ture by virtue of the identification of each generalized valuation with a subobject of the
coarse-graining presheaf G. An important part of any such study is likely to involve a
closer investigation of the negation operation in the Heyting algebras, which we have not
exploited in any significant way so far.
A crucial question regarding the space of all generalized valuations is to understand the
mathematical status of the valuations νρ generated by the mixed states ρ in the quantum
system. In particular, if we impose the ‘unit proposition condition’ of Eq. (3.28), is it
possible to find a set of extra conditions to be imposed on the generalized valuations that
will guarantee that every subobject of G that satisfies these and the original defining
conditions Eqs. (4.6—4.8), has the form νρ for some density matrix ρ? In effect, we are
asking for a contextualized, Heyting-algebra valued analogue of the Gleason theorem. It
seems likely that an important role in such an analysis will be played by the one-parameter
family of generalized valuations νr,ρ defined in Eq. (4.57).
A number of other questions suggest themselves. For example, is our theory of gen-
eralized values of physical quantities and propositions related at all to existing ideas on
‘unsharp’ values of quantum quantities (as described, for example, in [22])? Another
important example is the relation of our constructions to the standard probabilistic state-
ments of quantum theory.
Another important issue is to see how the phenomenon of quantum entanglement is
reflected in the truth-values assigned by our generalized valuations. Thus we should study
possible relations between a generalized valuation νψ, where ψ is an entangled state in
a tensor product H1 ⊗H2, and the generalized valuations associated with vectors in the
constituent Hilbert spaces H1 and H2.
The discussion in Section 5.3 of coarse-graining in the category W of Boolean subal-
gebras implies that there might be coarse-graining functors other than the canonical one
given in Definition 5.4. It is clearly important to see if this is indeed the case, since each
such functor would give rise to a whole new class of generalized valuations. In particular,
this is relevant to the problem mentioned above of classifying generalized valuations. It
would also be interesting to study this question in a simple model quantum-logic situation
in which the orthoalgebra of propositions is not the projection lattice of a Hilbert space.
Finally, there is the question of the Kochen-Specker theorem itself: in particular, the
possibility of finding a new proof based on some theory of obstructions to the construc-
tion of global sections of the spectral presheaf, rather as one studies obstructions to the
construction of global cross-sections of non-trivial fibre bundles. This is an intriguing
mathematical challenge, and one whose solution could generate a deeper insight into the
ultimate significance of the Kochen-Specker theorem. It could also suggest ways of using
topos ideas in quantum theory other than the coarse-graining scheme employed in the
present paper.
Acknowledgements
Chris Isham is most grateful to the Mrs L.D. Rope Third Charitable Settlement for
financial assistance during the course of this work.
A A Brief Account of the Relevant Parts of Topos
Theory
A.1 Presheaves on a Poset
Topos theory is a remarkably rich branch of mathematics which can be approached from
a variety of different viewpoints. The relevant general area of mathematics is category
theory; where, we recall, a category consists of a collection of objects and a collection of
morphisms (or arrows). In the special case of the category of sets, the objects are sets,
and a morphism is a function between a pair of sets. In general, each morphism f in a
category is associated with a pair of objects, known as its ‘domain’ and the ‘codomain’,
and is written in the form f : B → A where B and A are the domain and codomain
respectively. Note that this arrow notation is used even if f is not a function in the
normal set-theoretic sense. A key ingredient in the definition of a category is that if
f : B → A and g : C → B (i.e., the codomain of g is equal to the domain of f) then f
and g can be ‘composed’ to give an arrow f ◦ g : C → A; in the case of the category of
sets, this is just the usual composition of functions.
In many categories, the objects are sets equipped with some type of additional struc-
ture, and the morphisms are functions that preserve this structure; for example, in the
category of groups, an object is a group, and a morphism f : G1 → G2 is a map from
the group G1 to the group G2 that is also a homomorphism. However, not all categories
are of this type. For example, any partially-ordered set (‘poset’) C can be regarded as a
category in which (i) the objects are defined to be the elements of C; and (ii) if p, q ∈ C,
a morphism from p to q is defined to exist if, and only if, p ≤ q in the poset structure.
Thus, in a poset regarded as a category, there is at most one morphism between any pair
of objects p, q ∈ C; if it exists, we shall write this morphism as ipq : p→ q.
From our perspective, the most relevant feature of a topos is that it is a category
in which the subobjects of an object behave in many ways like the subsets of a set
in set theory [17, 18]. In particular, the subsets K ⊆ X of a set X are in one-to-
one correspondence with functions χK : X → {0, 1}, where χK(x) = 1 if x ∈ K, and
χK(x) = 0 otherwise. Thus the target space {0, 1} can be regarded as the simplest
‘false-true’ Boolean algebra, and the proposition ‘x ∈ K’ is true if χK(x) = 1, and false
otherwise.
In the case of a topos, the subobjects K of an object X in the topos are in one-to-
one correspondence with morphisms χK : X → Ω, where the special object Ω in the
topos—called the ‘subobject classifier’, or ‘object of truth-values’—plays an analogous
role to that of {0, 1} in the category of sets. In particular, we are interested in the
theory of presheaves where, as we shall see, a morphism χK : X → Ω corresponds to a
contextualized, multi-valued truth assignment.
To illustrate the main ideas, we will first give a few definitions from the theory of
presheaves on a partially ordered set (or ‘poset’); physically, this poset will represent the
space of ‘contexts’ in which generalized truth-values are to be assigned. We shall then
use these ideas to motivate the definition of a presheaf on a general category. Only the
briefest of treatments is given here, and the reader is referred to the standard literature
for more information [17, 18].
A presheaf (also known as a varying set) X on a poset C is a function that assigns
to each p ∈ C, a set Xp; and to each pair p ≤ q, a map Xqp : Xq → Xp such that (i)
Xpp : Xp → Xp is the identity map idXp onXp, and (ii) whenever p ≤ q ≤ r, the composite
map Xr
Xrq−→ Xq Xqp−→ Xp is equal to Xr Xrp−→ Xp, so that16
Xrp = Xqp ◦Xrq. (A.1)
A morphism η : X → Y between two presheaves X, Y on C is a family of maps
ηp : Xp → Yp, p ∈ C, that satisfy the intertwining conditions
ηp ◦Xqp = Yqp ◦ ηq (A.2)
whenever p ≤ q. This is equivalent to the commutative diagram
Xqyηq
Yq
Xqp−→
Yqp−→
Xpyηp
Yp
(A.3)
A subobject of a presheaf X is a presheaf K, with a morphism i : K → X such that
(i) Kp ⊆ Xp for all p ∈ C; and (ii) for all p ≤ q, the map Kqp : Kq → Kp is the restriction
of Xqp : Xq → Xp to the subset Kq ⊆ Xq. This is shown in the commutative diagram
Kqy
Xq
Kqp−→
Xqp−→
Kpy
Xp
(A.4)
where the vertical arrows are subset inclusions.
The collection of all presheaves on a poset C forms a category, denoted SetCop . The
morphisms between presheaves in this category are defined as the morphisms above.
16A matter of convention is involved here. Sometimes a presheaf is defined as above except that, to
each p ≤ q, one associates a function Xpq : Xp → Xq that maps Xp to Xq, rather than the function
Xqp that maps Xq to Xp. To reflect this, equation Eq. (A.1) is replaced by Xpr = Xqr ◦ Xpq for
p ≤ q ≤ r. Presheaves in the sense of the main text are in one-to-one correspondence with presheaves in
this alternative sense, in which the latter are defined on the opposite poset Cop—defined to be the same
set as C but with all the partial ordering relations reversed.
A.2 Presheaves on a General Category
The ideas sketched above admit an immediate generalization to the theory of presheaves
on an arbitrary ‘small’ category C (the qualification ‘small’ means that the collection of
objects is a genuine set, as is the collection of all morphisms between any pair of objects).
To make the necessary definition we first need the idea of a ‘functor’:
1. The Idea of a Functor: A central concept is that of a ‘functor’ between a pair of
categories C and D. Broadly speaking, this is a morphism-preserving function from one
category to the other. The precise definition is as follows.
Definition A.1
1. A covariant functor F from a category C to a category D is a function that assigns
(a) to each C-object A, a D-object F(A);
(b) to each C-morphism f : B → A, a D-morphism F(f) : F(B)→ F(A) such that
F(idA) = idF(A); and, if g : C → B, and f : B → A then
F(f ◦ g) = F(f) ◦ F(g). (A.5)
2. A contravariant functor X from a category C to a category D is a function that
assigns
(a) to each C-object A, a D-object X(A);
(b) to each C-morphism f : B → A, a D-morphism X(f) : X(A) → X(B) such
that X(idA) = idX(A); and, if g : C → B, and f : B → A then
X(f ◦ g) = X(g) ◦X(f). (A.6)
The connection with the idea of a presheaf on a poset is straightforward. As mentioned
above, a poset C can be regarded as a category in its own right, and it is clear that a
presheaf on the poset C is the same thing as a contravariant functor X from the category
C to the category ‘Set’ of normal sets. Equivalently, it is a covariant functor from the
‘opposite’ category17 Cop to Set. More precisely, in terms of the notation used earlier, the
sets Xp, p ∈ C, are defined as
Xp := X(p) (A.7)
and, if p ≤ q (so that ipq : p→ q), the map Xqp : Xq → Xp is defined as
Xqp := X(ipq). (A.8)
Clearly, Eq. (A.1) corresponds to the contravariant condition Eq. (A.6).
17The ‘opposite’ of a category C is a category, denoted Cop, whose objects are the same as those of C,
and whose morphisms are defined to be the opposite of those of C; i.e., a morphism f : A→ B in Cop is
said to exist if, and only if, there is a morphism f : B → A in C.
2. Presheaves on an Arbitrary Category C: These remarks motivate the definition
of a presheaf on an arbitrary small category C: namely, a presheaf on C is a covariant
functor X : Cop → Set from Cop to the category of sets. Equivalently, a presheaf is a
contravariant functor from C to the category of sets.
We want to make the collection of presheaves on C into a category, and therefore we
need to define what is meant by a ‘morphism’ between two presheaves X and Y. The
intuitive idea is that such a morphism from X to Y must give a ‘picture’ of X within Y.
Formally, such a morphism is defined to be a natural transformation N : X→ Y, by which
is meant a family of maps (called the components of N) NA : X(A)→ Y(A), A in C, such
that if f : B → A is a morphism in C, then the composite map X(A) NA−→ Y(A) Y(f)−→ Y(B)
is equal to X(A)
X(f)−→ X(B) NB−→ Y(B). In other words, we have the commutative diagram
X(A)yNA
Y(A)
X(f)−→
Y(f)−→
X(B)yNB
Y(B)
(A.9)
of which Eq. (A.3) is clearly a special case. The category of presheaves on C equipped
with these morphisms is denoted SetC
op
.
The idea of a subobject generalizes in an obvious way. Thus we say thatK is a subobject
of X if there is a morphism in the category of presheaves (i.e., a natural transformation)
i : K→ X with the property that, for each A, the component map iA : K(A)→ X(A) is
a subset embedding, i.e., K(A) ⊆ X(A). Thus, if f : B → A is any morphism in C, we
get the analogue of the commutative diagram Eq. (A.4):
K(A)y
X(A)
K(f)−→
X(f)−→
K(B)y
X(B)
(A.10)
where, once again, the vertical arrows are subset inclusions.
The category of presheaves on C, SetOop , forms a topos. We do not need the full
definition of a topos; but we do need the idea, mentioned in Section A.1, that a topos has
a subobject classifier Ω, to which we now turn.
3. Sieves and The Subobject Classifier Ω: Among the key concepts in presheaf the-
ory, and something of particular importance for this paper, is that of a ‘sieve’, which plays
a central role in the construction of the subobject classifier in the topos of emphasized on
a category C.
A sieve on an object A in C is defined to be a collection S of morphisms f : B → A in
C with the property that if f : B → A belongs to S, and if g : C → B is any morphism,
then f ◦ g : C → A also belongs to S. 18 In the simple case where C is a poset, a sieve on
18A cosieve on A is defined to be a collection S of morphisms f : A → B with the property that if
f : A → B belongs to S, and if g : B → C is any morphism, then g ◦ f : A → C also belongs to S.
However, another matter of convention is involved here: some authors interchange our usage of the words
‘sieve’ and ‘cosieve’. Note that, in any event, a sieve in C is the same thing as a cosieve in Cop, and vice
versa.
p ∈ C is any subset S of C such that if r ∈ S then (i) r ≤ p, and (ii) r′ ∈ S for all r′ ≤ r;
in other words, a sieve is nothing but a lower set in the poset.
The presheaf Ω : C → Set is now defined as follows. If A is an object in C, then Ω(A)
is defined to be the set of all sieves on A; and if f : B → A, then Ω(f) : Ω(A) → Ω(B)
is defined as
Ω(f)(S) := {h : C → B | f ◦ h ∈ S} (A.11)
for all S ∈ Ω(A); the sieve Ω(f)(S) is often written as f ∗(S), and is known as the pull-back
to B of the sieve S on A by the morphism f : B → A.
For our purposes in what follows, it is important to note that if S is a sieve on A, and
if f : B → A belongs to S, then from the defining property of a sieve we have
f ∗(S) := {h : C → B | f ◦ h ∈ S} = {h : C → B} =: ↓B (A.12)
where ↓B denotes the principal sieve on B, defined to be the set of all morphisms in C
whose codomain is B. In words: the pull-back of any sieve on A by a morphism from B
to A that belongs to the sieve, is the principal sieve on B.
If C is a poset, the pull-back operation corresponds to a family of maps Ωqp : Ωq → Ωp
(where Ωp denotes the set of all sieves on p in the poset) defined by Ωqp = Ω(ipq) if
ipq : p→ q (i.e., p ≤ q). It is straightforward to check that if S ∈ Ωq, then
Ωqp(S) :=↓p ∩ S (A.13)
where ↓p := {r ∈ C | r ≤ p}.
A crucial property of sieves is that the set Ω(A) of sieves on A has the structure of a
Heyting algebra.19 This is defined to be a distributive lattice, with null and unit elements,
that is relatively complemented , which means that to any pair S1, S2 in Ω(A), there exists
an element S1 ⇒ S2 of Ω(A) with the property that, for all S ∈ Ω(A),
S ≤ (S1 ⇒ S2) if and only if S ∧ S1 ≤ S2. (A.14)
Specifically, Ω(A) is a Heyting algebra where the unit element 1Ω(A) in Ω(A) is the
principal sieve ↓A, and the null element 0Ω(A) is the empty sieve ∅. The partial ordering
in Ω(A) is defined by S1 ≤ S2 if, and only if, S1 ⊆ S2; and the logical connectives are
defined as:
S1 ∧ S2 := S1 ∩ S2 (A.15)
S1 ∨ S2 := S1 ∪ S2 (A.16)
S1 ⇒ S2 := {f : B → A | for all g : C → B if f ◦ g ∈ S1 then f ◦ g ∈ S2}.(A.17)
As in any Heyting algebra, the negation of an element S (called the pseudo-complement
of S) is defined as ¬S := S ⇒ 0; so that
¬S := {f : B → A | for all g : C → B, f ◦ g 6∈ S}. (A.18)
19The paradigmatic example of a Heyting algebra is the set of all open sets in a topological space Z.
The algebraic operations are defined as O1 ∧O2 := O1 ∩O2; O1 ∨O2 := O1 ∪O2; and ¬O := int(Z −O).
The main distinction between a Heyting algebra and a Boolean algebra is that, in the
former, the negation operation does not necessarily obey the law of excluded middle:
instead, all that be can said is that, for any element S,
S ∨ ¬S ≤ 1. (A.19)
It can be shown that the presheaf Ω is a subobject classifier for the topos SetC
op
. That
is to say, subobjects of any object X in this topos (i.e., any presheaf on C) are in one-
to-one correspondence with morphisms χ : X → Ω. This works as follows. First, let K
be a subobject of X. Then there is an associated characteristic morphism χK : X→ Ω,
whose ‘component’ χKA : X(A)→ Ω(A) at each ‘stage of truth’ A in C is defined as
χKA (x) := {f : B → A | X(f)(x) ∈ K(B)} (A.20)
for all x ∈ X(A). That the right hand side of Eq. (A.20) actually is a sieve on A follows
from the defining properties of a subobject.
Thus, in each ‘branch’ of the category C going ‘down’ from the stage A, χKA (x) picks
out the first member B in that branch for which X(f)(x) lies in the subset K(B), and
the commutative diagram Eq. (A.10) then guarantees that X(h ◦ f)(x) will lie in K(C)
for all h : C → B. Thus each stage of truth A in C serves as a possible context for an
assignment to each x ∈ X(A) of a generalized truth-value: which is a sieve, belonging to
the Heyting algebra Ω(A), rather than an element of the Boolean algebra {0, 1} of normal
set theory. This is the sense in which contextual, generalized truth-values arise naturally
in a topos of presheaves.
There is a converse to Eq. (A.20): namely, each morphism χ : X→ Ω (i.e., a natural
transformation between the presheaves X and Ω) defines a subobject Kχ of X via
Kχ(A) := χ−1A {1Ω(A)}. (A.21)
at each stage of truth A.
For this reason, the presheaf Ω is known as the subobject classifier in the category
SetC
op
. As mentioned above, the existence of such an object is one of the defining prop-
erties for a category to be a topos, which SetC
op
is.
3. Global Sections of a Presheaf: In any category, a terminal object is defined to
be an object 1 with the property that, for any object X in the category, there is a unique
morphism X → 1; it is easy to show that terminal objects are unique up to isomorphism.
A global element of an object X is then defined to be any morphism 1 → X. The
motivation for this nomenclature is that, in the case of the category of sets, a terminal
object is any singleton set {∗}; and then it is true that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the elements of a set X and functions from {∗} to X.
For the category of presheaves on C, a terminal object 1 : C → Set can be defined by
1(A) := {∗} at all stages A in C; if f : B → A is a morphism in C then 1(f) : {∗} → {∗}
is defined to be the map ∗ 7→ ∗. This is indeed a terminal object since, for any presheaf
X, we can define a unique natural transformation N : X → 1 whose components NA :
X(A)→ 1(A) = {∗} are the constant maps x 7→ ∗ for all x ∈ X(A).
A global element of a presheaf X is also called a global section. As a morphism
γ : 1 → X in the topos SetCop , a global section corresponds to a choice of an element
γA ∈ X(A) for each stage of truth A in C, such that, if f : B → A, the ‘matching
condition’
X(f)(γA) = γB (A.22)
is satisfied. As we shall see, the Kochen-Specker theorem can be read as asserting the
non-existence of any global sections of certain presheaves that arises naturally in any
quantum theory.
4. Local Sections of a Presheaf: One of the important properties of a general topos
category is that an object may have ‘partial’, or ‘local’, elements even if there are no
global ones. In general, a local element of an object X in a category with a terminal
object is defined to be a morphism U → X, where U is a subobject of the terminal object
1. In the category of sets, there are no-nontrivial subobjects of 1 := {∗}, but this is not
the case in a general topos.
In particular, in the case of presheaves on C, a subobjectU of 1 is a collection of subsets
U(A) ⊆ {∗}, A in C, that satisfy the appropriate form of the commutative diagram Eq.
(A.10) that describes a subobject. However, the only subsets of {∗} are {∗} itself, and
the empty set ∅. Furthermore, there is a unique function ∅ → {∗} (the ‘empty’ function)
but no function {∗} → ∅. It follows, therefore, that in assigning the sets ∅ or {∗} to each
stage A for a subobject U of 1, the assignments of the singleton sets {∗} must be ‘closed
downwards’ in the sense that if U(A) = {∗} and if f : B → A is a morphism in C, then
we must have U(B) = {∗} also.
We deduce from this that a partial element of a presheaf X is an assignment γ of an
element γA to a certain subset of objects A in C—what we shall call the domain dom γ
of γ—with the properties that (i) the domain is closed downwards in the sense that if
A ∈ dom γ and f : B → A, then B ∈ dom γ; and (ii) for objects in this domain, the
matching condition Eq. (A.22) is satisfied.
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